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FOREWORD
Long-standing public programs, many dating back to the 
1930s, are coming under increasing strain and scrutiny. 
Those dealing with the problems of unemployed workers are 
prominent among them. Minor modifications and additions 
may not be enough to achieve the extent of reform needed to 
make existing programs viable in our contemporary setting. 
Saul Blaustein's proposed regrouping of unemployment in 
surance and related programs designed to deal with the needs 
of unemployed workers represents the reasoned type of 
reform worth considering.
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish this 
monograph by one of its staff researchers not only because 
of the fresh approach it describes, but also because it ad 
dresses a continuing and persistent dilemma of our 
times the waste of human resources resulting from 
unemployment. In drawing together diverse programs of in 
come support and employment services around the central 
goal of reemployment, the proposed scheme restores a focus 
that has become at least partially neglected over the years. 
The suggested restructuring of our present unemployment 
insurance program and establishment of a new unemploy 
ment assistance program represent major departures from 
current approaches, and the strong emphasis on reemploy 
ment efforts makes the whole scheme responsive to the grow 
ing sentiment that the problem often calls for more than in 
come support. Mr. Blaustein's long experience in research 
and analysis of unemployment insurance and related matters 
lends authority to his ideas and makes them deserving of 
serious consideration.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the author, and do not necessarily 
represent positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright 
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
June 1981
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PREFACE
Many of the ideas assembled in this monograph draw 
upon thinking and discussion extending back over a period 
of 25 years involving numerous colleagues and others in the 
fields of unemployment insurance, employment and train 
ing, and welfare. The initial opportunity to bring these ideas 
together within the concept of a new integrated system came 
in 1976 when the Michigan Department of Labor's Bureau 
of Employment and Training requested some alternative ap 
proaches for the state's unemployment insurance program. 
The result was a report made in 1977 entitled A New Job 
Security System for Michigan.
The preface to that earlier report set forth the following as 
the guiding point of view:
A fundamental consideration in developing pro 
gram alternatives has been to place unemployment 
insurance in a total context of government policy 
and action for helping the unemployed. In giving 
effect to that orientation, a major assumption is 
made that the basic focus of whatever assistance 
that is supplied to the unemployed must be on mov 
ing them into productive employment and a posi 
tion of self support. It was important, therefore, to 
consider carefully the total context and suggest how 
it could more effectively center on that assumption.
That same thought applies equally in the present 
monograph.
In the reformulation, the Job Security System is placed in 
a national orientation thereby overcoming a number of
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dilemmas when viewed on a state basis only. The System and 
its principal components receive further and fuller develop 
ment as well. The intent is to stimulate debate and other new 
ways of thinking about the continuing problems of 
unemployment and the means for dealing with them.
Of the many individuals who encouraged me and com 
mented very helpfully on this work, I feel moved to single 
out a few who perhaps can stand for all who did so. These in 
clude Ralph Altman, Father Joseph M. Becker, Jerry 
Beideman, Philip Booth, Raymond Munts, William Papier, 
George F. Rohrlich, and David W. Stevens. I am also 
grateful to Wilbur J. Cohen who invited me to present some 
of these ideas, particularly with respect to unemployment in 
surance, to the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation. That presentation yielded further useful 
comments and was summarized as "A Proposal for a New 
Job Security System With Three Tiers of Unemployment In 
surance" in Volume 1 of Unemployment Compensation 
Studies and Research accompanying the Commission's Final 
Report, July 1980.
Finally, I must acknowledge the diligence and patience of 
the supporting staff at the Upjohn Institute in seeing the 
monograph through many drafts to its final form. Any re 
maining shortcomings are my responsibility alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"I'm mighty glad to get this check, but getting 
back on the job is even better."
 Niels R. Ruud
"We have started to pay unemployment benefits 
in Wisconsin. . . . but let's not forget that steady 
work and wages will always be better than 
unemployment benefits."
 Paul Raushenbush
These two statements were made July 1, 1936 in Madison, 
Wisconsin on the occasion of the first unemployment in 
surance benefit payment ever made in the United States. 1 In 
his terse remark, the recipient expressed perfectly the ap 
propriate perspective about the benefit payment. The 
response by Mr. Raushenbush, the first and long-time direc 
tor of the Wisconsin program and one of the "fathers" of 
unemployment insurance in this country, underscored the 
joint objectives of income support and reemployment. In 
both statements, the emphasis on the latter is clear.
This monograph describes a new framework, called the 
Job Security System, 2 which would integrate the various
1. American Labor Legislation Review, September 1936, p. 102.
2. This title is used to distinguish the proposed system from the present federal-state system 
made up of state employment security agencies operating unemployment insurance and 
employment service programs.
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public programs designed to help experienced unemployed 
workers find work and to alleviate their unemployment. The 
scheme's main purpose is to organize these programs 
systematically and cohesively and focus them on the goal of 
employment. Its core objective is getting unemployed 
workers into suitable jobs. No one served by the proposed 
system is outside the labor force; each is capable of working 
and available for work. The presumption is that everyone 
who applies for help in finding work or for income 
maintenance during unemployment wants a job and is seek 
ing one.
By and large, clients of the Job Security System are 
unemployed workers with established labor force attach 
ment. New entrants and reentrants to the labor force may 
also be served, but they are likely to be aided more directly 
by programs provided under the Comprehensive Employ 
ment and Training Act (GETA), especially if there is a prob 
lem of low income and a lack of skills or work experience. 
The CETA programs are outside the proposed system. The 
Job Security System and CETA programs, however, must 
coordinate their services to assure that no one seeking 
employment who can be helped is neglected.
Besides job search assistance and other employment ser 
vices, the Job Security System (JSS) provides income sup 
port consisting, for the most part, of two types of wage-loss 
compensation: unemployment insurance (UI) and a new pro 
gram of unemployment assistance (UA). UI is available as a 
matter of right to covered unemployed workers who meet 
certain employment-related conditions, such as past and cur 
rent labor force attachment. UA would be available to the 
noninsured unemployed those who exhaust UI benefits or 
are not covered by UI who meet similar conditions plus an 
income test. In addition, the system would administer a 
number of special programs that supplement UI for certain 
categories of unemployed workers, such as trade adjustment
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assistance for workers adversely affected by foreign imports. 
The system may also pay cash benefits or allowances in con 
nection with specific adjustment activities, such as retraining 
and relocation, when undertaken by unemployed workers.
The JSS deals with the unemployed as individuals and 
with individual employers who want workers. It does not, as 
such, treat the general problem of unemployment, of general 
insufficiency in the demand for labor. That is the concern of 
fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies. The proposed 
system's main thrust is to guide the unemployed labor supply 
to the jobs available and, to the extent it can, to help bring 
about the most efficient employment of the labor supply. In 
the process, the system would constantly update and im 
prove its knowledge of the labor market to identify jobs 
which are available and employers who are likely to need 
workers.
The expectation is that nearly all unemployed workers 
assisted by the system will become reemployed within a 
reasonable period of time, most within a few months. It 
must be emphasized, however, that this expectation can be 
realized only if the economy is in good health and generates a 
strong demand for labor. If labor demand is weak, the 
number of jobless workers will increase, as will the average 
duration of their unemployment, and the system will be less 
successful in achieving its goal despite its best efforts on 
behalf of clients. The value and effectiveness of the JSS will 
be most evident when there are jobs to be filled.
Justification for the New System
Many public programs now exist for aiding the 
unemployed. They include the state employment or job ser 
vices and various CETA programs operated by local govern 
ment units and by states. These programs offer job search 
and related employment services, vocational training, other
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vocational adjustment services, and temporary public service 
employment. 3 Other public programs provide various forms 
of income support for the unemployed. These include 
unemployment insurance, welfare payments through the 
federally subsidized Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC)-Unemployed Father program, 4 disaster 
unemployment assistance, a growing number of special pro 
grams aimed at compensating workers for job loss resulting 
from certain government policies, 5 and limited local or state 
general assistance that may be available for needy persons, 
including some who are unemployed. 6 Some federal pro 
grams provide other forms of financial assistance for the 
unemployed, such as food stamps, Medicaid, and housing 
subsidies; these are also available to persons who are not in 
the labor force. Some of the unemployed who are in public 
training programs may receive training allowances. 7
These programs began and evolved over the past 50 years, 
many of them within the last 20 years. Since problems of the 
unemployed are varied and numerous, it is not surprising 
that the measures devised to help overcome these problems 
are also varied and numerous. Taken together, the public 
programs available represent an extensive set of policies
3. At the time of writing (early 1981), the public service employment programs under 
CETA are being curtailed and scheduled to terminate by October 1981.
4. The standard AFDC program may also be included in this listing since some adult reci 
pients must register for work with the public employment service and be available for work. 
Not all AFDC recipients, however, are required to do so, such as those caring for small 
children or for family members who are sick or disabled.
5. These include, among others, Trade Adjustment Assistance (as provided under the 
Trade Act of 1974), the Redwood Employee Protection Program, two Railroad Employee 
Protection Programs, Urban Mass Transportation Protection, and the Airline Employee 
Protection Program.
6. The railroad UI program is not part of the present federal-state system and remains out 
side the proposed new system. Ideally, and eventually, it too should be included.
7. Other public income maintenance programs, such as social security-old age insurance, 
also supply support for the unemployed although that is not their particular objective. See 
Merrill G. Murray, Income for the Unemployed: The Variety and Fragmentation of Pro 
grams, (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, April 
1971), p. 70.
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ministering to the needs of unemployed persons. It is fair to 
ask, then, what the proposed new system can add. Why is it 
desirable to establish another or a different approach in an 
area already addressed by so many approaches? What does 
the proposed system offer that is different and significantly 
better than what present arrangements provide?
The Job Security System is designed not so much as a new 
additional approach for aiding the unemployed, but rather 
as a means for pulling existing programs together into a 
more coherent, integrated, and coordinated set of activities. 
Many of the existing programs developed at different times 
to meet specific needs without taking sufficient account of 
other programs already in place which served similar pur 
poses. A new program may have emerged because an existing 
program did not serve a particular need adequately or as 
precisely as desired, and because it often was easier to create 
a separate approach than try to adapt or improve a larger 
established program. There has been, for example, a pro 
liferation of special programs (see footnote 5) aimed at 
specific industries or groups of workers who are dislocated 
because of a public policy, such as tariff reduction 
agreements with other countries, or deregulation of a par 
ticular industry. These programs single out limited groups of 
workers for special treatment usually more generous than 
that provided by the more general programs. 8
Another kind of development has been the partial redirec 
tion of an existing program to serve purposes it was not 
originally intended or designed to serve. The use of 
unemployment insurance, for example, to compensate for 
very long term unemployment during 1975-1977 (up to 65 
weeks in some cases) went far beyond that program's
8. For a description and discussion of these programs, see Mamoru Ishikawa, Unemploy 
ment Insurance and Proliferation of Other Income Protection Programs for Experienced 
Workers, Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 80-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment In 
surance Service, 1980).
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original conception. The increased refocusing of the AFDC 
program on availability for work or training for many of its 
adult recipients is another example of a significant change in 
direction that places strains on a program's conceptual base 
and structure.
The motivations for these new developments have usually 
been quite reasonable and sound, and the approaches taken 
may also have been reasonable and sound up to a point. As 
new developments accumulate over time, however, without 
adequate coordination, confusions and inefficiencies multip 
ly. Both duplications and gaps in services and support for the 
unemployed may develop. There may be unequal treatment 
of the unemployed without justification that is apparent to 
recipients. Administrative responsibilities are fragmented. 
Programs may conflict or work at cross purposes, and 
tendencies develop to lose sight of intended goals. Ad 
ministrative difficulties increase and funds may be wasted. 
Both those who pay for the costs of these services and those 
who receive them have reason to complain. When such con 
ditions accumulate to major proportions, it is time to con 
sider consolidation and reform. The Job Security System is 
proposed as a means for such consolidation and reform.
The new system would also provide an opportunity to 
establish a common and consistent conceptual base for these 
programs, and that may be its most important justification. 
Too often, programs have narrow objectives and fail to take 
account of broader or more primary goals. More adequate 
income support for unemployed workers is an important 
purpose sought by some of the new special programs, but 
overconcentration on that objective can diminish emphasis 
on assisting the process of reemployment. To a large extent, 
the failure to pursue the latter goal more vigorously is a 
problem of administrative priorities and inadequate financ 
ing rather than statutory intent. The UI program has always 
required claimants to be available for work and to seek
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work, and looks to the employment service (ES) to assure 
their exposure to jobs. The ES, however, is continually 
diverted to place higher priorities on serving groups other 
than UI claimants, thereby reducing the reemployment em 
phasis for the latter. Moreover, the ES staff nationally has 
remained fixed in size for 15 years despite its heavier respon 
sibilities, which effectively bars any significant im 
provements in its services. The proposed JSS builds em 
phasis on the reemployment objective directly into its pro 
cedures so that it cannot be neglected so easily.
To repeat the point made at the outset, it is the premise of 
the new system that suitable reemployment is its core objec 
tive. Income support is a vital factor, but it should not over 
shadow the ultimate goal of employment; it should be ad 
ministered so as to support that goal as well as to alleviate 
hardship. The fact, for example, that recipients of AFDC or 
of state and local general assistance include both labor force 
participants and nonparticipants makes those programs ill- 
suited to pursue the employment objective for the former. 
The Job Security System alters the income support ar 
rangements for labor force participants now under these pro 
grams to correct for that deficiency.
Failure to pursue the employment objective vigorously has 
contributed to general public criticism of income 
maintenance programs. Much of the public regards these 
programs as too generous and too easily available to too 
many individuals who are suspected of being unavailable for 
work or unwilling to work, despite what they claim openly. 
Whether or not such criticism is fully justified, the lack of 
emphasis on reemployment assistance helps to convey and 
sustain the impression held. The proposed system offers the 
opportunity to reestablish the primacy of employment and 
thereby respond to public concerns over income maintenance 
programs.
8 Introduction
Another supporting argument for the proposed system is 
that it may open the way to resolve some problems in several 
existing programs that appear to have become intractable. 
By incorporating these existing programs within the system 
and integrating them around the central orientation of 
employment assistance, some restructuring and im 
provements can be made which may resolve their problems 
more readily than possible within their current contexts.
The public employment services, for example, require 
revitalization and strengthening. Their active integration 
with UI and other income assistance within the JSS stresses 
the reemployment goal for recipients and restores the 
employment service to the major role contemplated for it 
earlier but which has become increasingly remote over the 
years. Employment service financing requires reform and ex 
pansion which may have a better chance under the JSS 
design.
The federal-state UI program currently faces serious prob 
lems which appear very difficult to resolve within its pres 
ent structure, at least in a way that would attract broad 
agreement. Under the proposed JSS, the UI program would 
be restructured to emphasize close integration with 
reemployment assistance. The new structure also offers a 
way of treating two major problems that bedevil the present 
program the duration of UI protection and financial in 
solvency.
The establishment of a new unemployment assistance pro 
gram within the proposed new system seeks to rationalize the 
treatment of some AFDC recipients as labor force par 
ticipants and to close the gaps that exist in the support of 
other needy unemployed persons. Welfare reform proposals 
continue to mix welfare and employment assistance without 
adequate distinctions among recipients so that the latter can 
be applied effectively. The incorporation of UA within the
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JSS would make that distinction clear. Welfare reform could 
then deal more readily with those AFDC recipients who can 
not work or are not expected to work.
General Design
The JSS proposal calls for a comprehensive and integrated 
system that provides various employment assistance services 
and income support to unemployed workers, and to some 
underemployed workers as well. The system combines, 
restructures, and improves upon present employment and in 
come support programs to assure closer coordination among 
them, greater efficiency of their operations, and more com 
plete coverage of the needs of the unemployed. It assumes 
that private sector activity and public economic policies will 
keep overall unemployment levels within manageable 
bounds; the system's services and support are likely to prove 
inadequate and ineffective under conditions of prolonged 
mass unemployment no matter how well organized and in 
tegrated they are. 9
At all times, the Job Security System emphasizes employ 
ment promotion efforts to help jobseekers find satisfactory 
work. Income support is viewed as a temporary measure 
available only when reasonable employment is not available 
and while jobseeking efforts proceed. Income support is im 
portant to the unemployed, but its provision must not 
obscure the focus on promotion of reemployment. If 
unemployment continues for a very long period, particularly 
under generally normal labor market conditions, the in 
dividual's employability may require reevaluation. The 
possibility must be considered that the very long term jobless 
worker may in fact be unemployable. That individual might
9. One hesitates to specify a particular limit above which unemployment would be con 
sidered unmanageable, but the peak unemployment rates experienced in the 1975 recession 
period would surely qualify as such if continued for very long.
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be offered a place in a sheltered workshop program or 
shifted to the Supplemental Security Income program cur 
rently available for the disabled and the aged who need such 
support.
While the proposed JSS is national in scope, it is designed 
to operate essentially through state-administered programs. 
State UI and job services would continue, but subject to 
some modifications or adaptations required by restructuring 
under the new system. Federal and state governments would 
continue as partners in the system, but the balance of respon 
sibility and control would shift more towards a national 
orientation with regard to the problem of long term 
unemployment. The shift reflects a recognition that when 
unemployment becomes increasingly prolonged for in 
dividual workers, the means required to support them and to 
resolve their problems may lie increasingly beyond the 
capacities of local and state resources.
Central to the Job Security System is the registration of 
jobseekers for work and the listing of as many job openings 
as possible at the public employment or job security offices. 
The key is the establishment of a genuine, fully-functioning 
labor exchange. With some exceptions, registration would be 
compulsory for all those seeking income support and 
employment assistance provided under the system.
Jobseekers would be diagnosed and classified according to 
their need for job search assistance. Assistance could range 
from simply providing access to a listing of job openings to 
planning and facilitating substantial training or rehabilita 
tion. Where a job is not immediately available, the 
unemployed worker may draw income support if eligible. 
Following initial diagnosis, the system would provide for 
further review, at appropriate times, of the registrant's job 
search activities and reassessment of need for help if 
unemployment continues. The advice and assistance sup 
plied would then change accordingly.
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Since most subsidized public service employment and 
training for the unemployed are now organized and ad 
ministered through decentralized CETA programs, the Job 
Security System must coordinate its activities closely with 
these programs. How best to achieve the proper coordina 
tion between CETA and the public employment service is 
currently an uncertain and controversial matter. No attempt 
is made here to deal with the question. Evaluation of CETA- 
employment service relations should be pressed to illuminate 
the problems. Their resolution should aim at serving the best 
interests of jobseekers and employers. Through improved 
collection and analysis of labor market information, the JSS 
would continuously monitor the need for employability 
development services, training, and public service employ 
ment for its clients. Such information and analysis also form 
an important base for planning CETA programs. Because 
eligibility rules exclude many unemployed workers from 
CETA programs, the JSS should have the flexibility of pro 
viding similar types of services to such workers when the 
need is indicated.
Income support supplied through the Job Security System 
is identified clearly as support for labor force participants. 
Income support for nonparticipants should be supplied out 
side this system. Some of the present welfare programs mix 
the two. These should be redesigned so that labor force par 
ticipants now serviced through welfare programs would 
receive their support through the JSS. A major innovation 
proposed with JSS is the establishment of a new unemploy 
ment assistance program to supply income support to needy 
unemployed jobseekers who are not eligible to receive 
unemployment insurance. Unemployment assistance would 
replace present welfare support for those who are able to 
work and expected to seek employment and who have some 
work experience. Like unemployment insurance, UA would 
be available as a weekly benefit.
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Under the proposed system, unemployment insurance is 
restructured as a three-tiered program to cover short, 
medium, and long term unemployment, and to limit its total 
scope to the first 39 weeks of unemployment. The full extent 
of UI protection would be available to eligible unemployed 
workers at all times; the payment of long term benefits 
would not depend on the rate of unemployment. Any sup 
port beyond the UI limit would be supplied through the 
unemployment assistance program. The new arrangement 
eliminates special extensions of unemployment benefits dur 
ing recession periods. Each UI tier has its own eligibility re 
quirements and job search conditions. The proposed method 
of financing UI benefit costs is geared to the three-tiered ar 
rangement.
The Job Security System, as proposed, also encompasses 
other forms of support and employment assistance, such as 
training allowance supplements, relocation assistance, and 
other rehabilitation measures.
The proposed system takes account of the varied composi 
tion of the unemployed as analyzed in terms of certain 
characteristics that are relevant to distinguishing job search 
service and income support needs. In describing the plan, 
this monograph proceeds first with an analysis of the 
system's potential clientele in terms of some of these 
characteristics. It then discusses the types of services and in 
come support provided under the system for each clientele 
category. The type of services and support available, and the 
manner in which they are supplied, may vary at different 
stages of an individual's unemployment or with the condi 
tion of the relevant labor market. These distinctions are im 
portant and also noted. Following this presentation of what 
the system offers for different categories of the unemployed, 
each type of proposed service or income support is more ful 
ly described with regard to content and financing, with par 
ticular emphasis on explaining changes from existing ar-
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rangements, the reasons for the changes, and some opposing 
arguments.
Recently, the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation (NCUC) completed a two and one-half year 
study of the federal-state UI program and related 
problems. 10 Many of the concerns of the Commission 
overlap those addressed by the JSS proposal. Where ap 
propriate, NCUC recommendations will be indicated and 
discussed in this monograph.
10. Unemployment Compensation: Final Report, National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation, Washington, DC, July 1980.

II. POTENTIAL CLIENTELE 
OF THE JOB SECURITY SYSTEM
Table 1 analyzes the unemployed labor force by sex-age 
categories and by reasons for unemployment. The latter con 
cern whether or not the unemployed had been working just 
prior to their unemployment and, among those who had, the 
nature of their job separation. Data are shown for 1975 and 
1979 to compare a recession year with a year of lower 
unemployment. Not only is the total level of unemployment 
different between the two years, but the distributions by 
reasons for unemployment are also different. In 1975, for 
example, workers on layoff and job losers together compris 
ed over half (55 percent) of the unemployed compared with 
43 percent in 1979. These unemployed workers account for 
most of the insured unemployed; in 1975 and 1979, insured 
unemployment made up about 63 and 44 percent, respective 
ly, of all unemployment. 1
The data in the table represent annual average levels of 
unemployment for each year. The total number of persons 
experiencing unemployment at any time during the year is 
much larger. It was 21.1 million in 1975 and 17.9 million in 
1979. 2 Information available about all persons experiencing 
unemployment during the year does not permit their analysis 
by reasons for unemployment. Their numbers, however, af-
1. Based on data in Economic Indicators, March 1980, p. 13.
2. Data from Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980, p. 303, and from 
News from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 18, 1980.
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Table 1
Potential Unemployed Clientele of Proposed Job Security System by Reason for Unemployment, Sex and Age
Annual Averages, 1975 and 1979
1975
Reason for 
unemployment
All unemployed
Thousands
Percent
Previously employed
On temporary layoff
Job losers
Job leavers
Not previously employed
Reentrants
New entrants
Total
7,830
100.0
65.8
21.2
34.2
10.4
34.2
23.8
10.4
Age 20
Male
3,428
100.0
83.5
28.8
46.2
8.5
16.5
14.5
2.1
and over
Female
2,649
100.0
63.9
20.5
29.5
13.9
36.1
31.9
4.2
Age 16 
to 19
1,752
100.0
34.3
7.6
18.0
8.7
65.7
29.9
35.8
Total
5,963
100.0
57.1
14.0
28.8
14.3
42.9
29.5
13.4
1979
Age 20
Male
2,223
100.0
77.7
20.8
42.8
14.1
22.3
19.3
3.0
and over
Female
2,213
100.0
53.6
13.1
24.2
16.3
46.3
40.0
6.3
Age 16 
to 19
1,528
100.0
32.3
5.4
15.1
11.8
67.6
29.0
38.6
Potential
0
3
O>
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings, January 1977, p. 147, and January 1980, p. 168.
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ford some idea of the volume of potential clients of the Job 
Security System. 3
Most of the unemployed were working just prior to their 
unemployment 66 percent in 1975 and 57 percent in 1979. 
Reentrants and new entrants into the labor force constitute 
the rest of the unemployed. Of this category, about four out 
of five were women or teenagers, in both years.
The following discussion elaborates further on the com 
position of each category of unemployed individuals, there 
by providing some background in preparation for the later 
description of the services that would be supplied by the Job 
Security System.
Unemployed Workers—Previously Employed
These are workers who have temporarily or permanently 
separated from their jobs. They can be divided into three 
groups on the basis of the temporary or permanent nature of 
the separation and whether the permanent separation was 
voluntary or involuntary.
Workers on temporary layoff
This group consists of workers who are placed on tem 
porary layoff with expectation of recall. They remain attach 
ed to their jobs though not on the active payroll. Certain job- 
connected fringe benefits may continue for these workers. 
The group subdivides further on the basis of the expected 
length of the layoff or the degree of assurance of recall, fac 
tors that are not always clear or definite. For various pur 
poses, it is useful to distinguish between workers on a 
specific short term or limited term layoff, say for no more
3. Over 11 million workers began drawing UI benefits in 1975 and over 8 million in 1979 
(from Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employment and Training Administration).
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than 30, 60, or 90 days, and those on a longer or indefinite 
layoff. The indefinite layoff can turn out to be long term or 
permanent; at some point it is advisable for such an in 
dividual to pursue prospects for alternative employment. 
Most workers on short term layoffs do not actively seek 
other jobs.
About 55 to 60 percent of this group consist of adult men 
and about a third or more, adult women; the small re 
mainder are teenagers. The proportion of the unemployed 
who are on temporary layoff is substantially higher during 
recession periods. Nearly all of them are eligible to draw UI 
benefits.
Job losers
These are workers who have been separated from their 
jobs involuntarily. They divide into the following three 
subgroups with varying implications for income support 
eligibility:
Workers discharged because of misconduct; 
Workers retired compulsorily from their jobs; 
All other involuntary job losers.
Regardless of the reason for job loss, unemployed workers in 
these subgroups are considered able to work, available for 
work, and in an active search for work. Workers fired for 
misconduct are disqualified from drawing UI, at least for a 
period of time.
Unemployed retirees may receive pensions, but they still 
want and seek work. Normally, they qualify for UI benefits. 
In some cases, the strength of their continued attachment to 
the labor force comes under question. The pension received 
may be deducted from their UI benefits, leaving reduced 
weekly benefits or none at all. 4
4. A federal provision requires the states to deduct certain pensions drawn by claimants, in 
cluding social security pensions, from their UI benefits.
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Most other job losers are eligible to draw UI. Adult men 
make up about 55 to 60 percent of all job losers, adult 
women account for about 30 percent, and the rest are 
teenagers.
Job leavers
These workers have resigned or quit their jobs voluntarily. 
As unemployed, they are assumed to be available for and 
seeking work. They are not eligible to draw UI, at least for a 
period of time, unless they left for a good cause that is ac 
ceptable for UI purposes.
In some cases, the distinction between a job leaver and a 
job loser is not absolutely clear. The reason for the separa 
tion, or whether there was "good cause" for leaving, may be 
disputed between the worker and the former employer. On 
the one hand, the worker may feel that the employer exerted 
great pressures, subtle or not so subtle, to force a quit, in 
which case the separation was tantamount to a discharge. On 
the other hand, the worker may really want to leave but ar 
ranges to be fired, or induces the employer to do so, to avoid 
a voluntary-quit disqualification for UI benefits. The prob 
lem of making the appropriate distinction affects UI eligibili 
ty more than it does the administration of job services.
The proportion of the unemployed who are voluntary job 
leavers declines in recessions. It was about 10 percent in 1975 
compared with 14 percent in 1979. In 1975 and 1979, over 35 
percent of all job leavers were adult men and over 45 percent 
were adult women; the remainder, about 20 percent, were 
teenagers.
Unemployed Persons Not Previously Employed
This category consists of people who have never worked 
before (new entrants) or who left the labor force for a time
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after the last job they held (reentrants). Reentrants are the 
more sizable group, over twice as numerous as new entrants.
Reentrants
This group reflects a wide range of circumstances, varying 
by how long the individual was out of the labor force; 
whether the last job was regular or temporary, intermittent, 
or part-time; and whether the reentrant currently seeks a 
regular permanent job or a temporary one.
Among reentrants in 1975 and 1979, about 45 and 50 per 
cent, respectively, were adult women; the rest were split 
about evenly between adult men and teenagers.
One important distinction that should be made is between 
those who had some employment during the year preceding 
reentrance (or during a base period as defined for unemploy 
ment insurance purposes) and those who did not. Among 
reentrants who did work recently, those who lost their jobs 
before they left the labor force may be eligible for UI 
benefits when they return to seek work.
New entrants
Strictly speaking, this group represents people who never 
worked before; they are seeking their first jobs. Most are 
youths who are still in school, or who have just finished or 
left school. About 75 percent of all new entrants in both 1975 
and 1979 were teenagers. Of the remainder, the majority 
were adult women.
It is useful to distinguish between new entrants seeking 
temporary or short term employment and others looking for 
regular jobs with expectations of long term labor force at 
tachment. An individual who has worked before but only on 
temporary or short-time jobs for limited periods and who 
was not a regular labor force participant may at some point
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become interested in regular, permanent employment. While 
classified as a reentrant, that person is, in effect, a new en 
trant into the regular labor force. 5 The administration of job 
services must take account of these circumstances.
Underemployed Workers
While most clients of the Job Security System are likely to 
be totally unemployed persons, others who are currently 
employed may also apply and qualify for services. Some 
work part time but want full-time jobs. Others in full-time 
jobs may feel they are working below their abilities and skills 
and seek better jobs. Some in temporary or seasonal jobs 
which will soon end seek other employment before job 
separation occurs. These groups together comprise what may 
loosely be called the underemployed. Consistent with its goal 
of promoting the most economically efficient use of our 
labor resources, the JSS would provide assistance to these 
workers in finding full employment.
The number of underemployed workers who seek or want 
full-time or better jobs is difficult to pin down. Information 
exists about workers employed part time (less than 35 hours 
per week) from the monthly Current Population Survey, the 
source of much of our labor force statistics. In 1980, an 
average of nearly 23 million persons worked part time during 
the weeks surveyed. 6 About 10.7 million of them did not 
want or were unable to work at full-time jobs. Another 8.0 
million worked less than 35 hours a week because of time lost 
due to illness, vacation, holidays, bad weather, and other 
noneconomic reasons, or because the job was normally 
scheduled for less than 35 hours a week. The remaining 4.2 
million worked part time for economic reasons. Over half of
5. As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, new entrants include persons who were 
previously employed only part time or who worked full time for less than 2 weeks.
6. Data from Employment and Earnings, January 1981, pp. 190-191.
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these workers were on short-time due to "slack work," and 
most usually worked full time. Most who usually worked 
part time did so because they could only find part-time work. 
Of the nearly 4 million nonagricultural workers employed 
part time for economic reasons, 54 percent had jobs in the 
trade and service industries, 47 percent were less than 25 
years old and 53 percent were female.
A survey conducted in May 1976 identified 3.3 million ful 
ly employed workers who were seeking other jobs for the 
following reasons: 7
Higher wages or salaries .................. 34 percent
Better hours or working conditions ......... 11 percent
Better advancement opportunities .......... 10 percent
Current job ending, including temporary
or seasonal job ........................ 11 percent
Better use of skills ....................... 9 percent
Other reasons ........................... 25 percent
Some of these workers could also be classified as 
underemployed.
As potential clients of the JSS, underemployed workers do 
not include those who, as a matter of choice, work on a part- 
time or temporary basis or at levels below their capacities. 
Among involuntarily underemployed workers who might 
turn to the JSS for assistance, it is useful to determine 
whether their current underemployment is the result of a 
temporary reduction of the usual work schedule or a perma 
nent characteristic of the job itself.
Workers on temporarily reduced work schedules
This group is similar in many respects to workers placed 
on temporary layoffs. The latter can be seen as an extreme
7. Monthly Labor Review, March 1977, p. 60.
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case of a temporary cutback in the normal work schedule. 
Unless the cut in the workweek is especially deep, the present 
unemployment insurance programs in most states provide no 
compensation for lost wages even on a partial benefit basis. 
If the reduced work schedule is for a short period, the 
workers affected are not likely to be seeking other jobs or to 
require employment services. The proposed new structure 
for UI benefits would include improved partial benefit provi 
sions that accommodate work sharing through reduced 
schedules.
In 1979, on average, there were over 1.4 million workers 
employed part time for economic reasons who usually work 
ed full time; in recession year 1975, this group numbered 1.8 
million. 8 Included were workers who lost full-time jobs and 
took temporary part-time jobs until they could find full-time 
work.
Workers seeking other employment
One component of this group consists of workers who ex 
pect their current jobs to terminate and who are able to seek 
other jobs beforehand. Included are workers on temporary 
or seasonal jobs and those already notified that their jobs 
will end in the near future. If possible, such workers should 
be looking for further employment to avoid or minimize any 
subsequent unemployment. It is, however, difficult and 
often impossible to do so while still working full time. Job 
search services for these workers could be beneficial, 
especially if available after working hours.
Other underemployed jobseekers working below their 
capabilities seek jobs that better fulfill their potentials. Job 
search assistance can serve an upgrading function for such 
workers. Some unemployed job leavers may have been
8. Employment and Earnings, January 1980, p. 184, and January 1976, p. 150.
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motivated to quit because they were underemployed in this 
sense. To the extent they succeed in finding better employ 
ment, the jobs vacated may become available to unemployed 
workers with lesser capacities.
This chapter describes how the proposed Job Security 
System functions with respect to the unemployed and 
underemployed as grouped by the foregoing classifications. 
Most of the unemployed will enter a local JSS office to file 
for UI benefits or unemployment assistance (UA), or to seek 
help in finding work, or both. How they are treated will de 
pend on the reasons for their unemployment, how long 
unemployment has continued, and the current condition of 
the labor market. How and what kind of employment ser 
vices are rendered will depend also on the individual's educa 
tion, training, job experience, and occupational skills.
The stage of a workers' unemployment is an especially im 
portant consideration with regard to the job services and in 
come support supplied, as well as to how they are ad 
ministered. When the worker draws benefits, the conditions 
of eligibility and the type of benefits paid may change as 
unemployment becomes more and more prolonged. General 
ly speaking, major changes in these respects are assumed to 
occur at three-month intervals. This assumption underlies 
the proposed reorganization of the present federal-state UI 
program into the new three-tiered program.
While admittedly arbitrary, the three-tiered arrangement 
would force a deliberate reconsideration of the worker's cir 
cumstances and the need for any change in the job search ap 
proach being followed. If circumstances warranted, a review
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would be made even before the end of the three-month 
period. In the past, the UI program has applied the practice 
of periodic interviews of claimants, but not consistently or 
on a sustained basis. Often, determining the claimant's con 
tinuing eligibility for benefits has received much greater em 
phasis than determining the claimant's job search needs. Ex 
periments in the late 1960s and early 1970s with individual 
ized analysis and treatment of the reemployment needs of 
claimants encouraged further development of this approach, 
but budgetary constraints interfered. The current Eligibility 
Review Program has revived those efforts and is working 
toward widespread application in all states. 1 How well it suc 
ceeds depends heavily on resources allocated to the approach 
and on how far state agency officials are willing and able to 
push the idea down the line. So far, results appear mixed.
The formal move from one tier to the next under the 
restructured UI program would assure that a close review is 
made as needed, both for eligibility and job search purposes. 
It would impress the thought on both the claimant and the 
counselor that a new stage has begun which may call for 
some changes in attitude about the strategy and nature of the 
job search. Each tier would provide 13 weeks of benefits, but 
the eligibility conditions specified for each tier would be dif 
ferent and increasingly demanding. The tiers, successively, 
would compensate for short term, medium term, and long 
term unemployment. Beyond the third tier, income support 
would no longer be provided on an insurance basis, but 
would be available as unemployment assistance on the basis 
of an income text. Chapters V and VI describe in more detail 
these two income support programs under the proposed 
system.
1. The federal-state UI program is currently pursuing efforts to establish similar procedures 
for claimants through its Eligibility Review Program, outlined in General Administration 
Letter No. 5-77 issued to all state agencies on December 21, 1976 by the U.S. Department 
of Labor's Employment and Training Administration.
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The general level of unemployment and local labor market 
conditions would also influence the way job services and in 
come support are administered. Unlike the present UI pro 
gram, the proposed system would not automatically extend 
UI when unemployment reaches specified levels. Labor 
market conditions, however, would affect the services and 
benefit eligibility requirements, and how they do so is 
generally covered in this discussion.
The key individuals of the JSS staff involved directly with 
the unemployed worker would be the job search counselor 
and the benefit reviewer. In dealing with the UI claimant, 
both would work closely together; they would be located in 
the same office. A similar team would work with UA 
claimants, though perhaps in a different part of the office so 
as to keep the two programs distinct.
The counselor must be knowledgeable about current labor 
market conditions and job search practices, and about how 
different occupations and skills relate to each other so as to 
identify a range of jobs that the claimant can reasonably 
consider seeking. The counselor must also be aware of the 
availability of specialized services, e.g., aptitude testing, 
retraining and rehabilitation, to which the claimant can be 
referred, if appropriate. The benefit reviewer would apply 
the eligibility requirements and see that the claimant 
understands them. Both the counselor and the reviewer 
together would diagnose and reassess the claimant's job pro 
spects at the start of each UI tier and at other times as need 
ed. They would also consult together and with the claimant 
in developing a job search plan. The benefit reviewer would 
monitor the claimant's job search to see how well the plan is 
followed or if it needs change. Emphasis is always on en 
couragement and assistance to the claimant in finding 
employment. The expectation underlying this emphasis is 
that the true attitudes of the claimant with regard to desire 
and availability for work are more readily revealed in the
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context of a positive approach than in a direct attempt at the 
outset to question the claimant's labor force attachment and 
behavior.
Unemployed Workers-—Previously Employed
Workers on temporary layoff
All workers on a temporary layoff would be eligible for 
first-tier (short term) UI benefits, assuming they meet the 
minimum base-period employment and earnings qualifying 
requirements for this tier.
If recall to work is scheduled or definitely expected to take 
place within 30 days of the layoff, the worker would not 
need to register at the employment service or actively seek 
other employment during this period to maintain eligibility 
for benefits. The worker who wishes to do so may apply for 
job search services. If recall is expected after 30 days and 
within 90 days, the same conditions prevail. The worker's 
recall status, however, should be reconfirmed with the 
employer 30 days (or 4 weeks) and again 60 days (8 weeks) 
after the layoff.
If recall is not expected within 90 days, or if the layoff is or 
becomes indefinite, the worker must register for work and 
have a diagnosis made of reemployment prospects as a con 
dition for receiving UI. The diagnosis normally would be 
made when the worker files for the fourth or fifth week of 
benefits. If the labor market involving the individual's type 
of work is clearly in a recession, the required diagnosis could 
be delayed for several more weeks. If the layoff continues 
beyond eight weeks and remains indefinite, a job search plan 
would be prepared and implemented. If local labor market 
conditions continue unfavorable, however, that step could 
be postponed until after tier 1 benefits are exhausted.
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Workers on a temporary layoff who do not qualify for 
first tier UI because of insufficient past employment may be 
eligible for unemployment assistance, depending on 
household income. If job recall prospects are indefinite or 
likely to take more than 90 days to materialize, the same 
treatment applicable to UI claimants would apply to UA 
recipients as well.
Workers on layoff who exhaust their short term (tier 1) UI 
and continue to be unemployed would be treated the same as 
other job losers who exhaust tier 1.
Job losers—workers discharged for misconduct
Workers who qualify for tier 1 but have been discharged 
for misconduct would not be paid UI benefits for a period of 
weeks after which, if still unemployed, they could draw their 
benefits. At the end of the disqualification period, their job 
search experience and job prospects would be reviewed and 
any advisable adjustments in job search activity suggested. 
That review could occur earlier, during the disqualification 
period, at the claimant's request. These claimants should be 
urged to take advantage of other job services testing, 
counseling, etc. that may be appropriate in view of the cir 
cumstances of their discharge. In other respects, they would 
be treated in the same way as other job losers who draw UI. 
Discharged workers who do not qualify for UI on the basis 
of past employment but who do meet UA requirements may 
become eligible for UA following a disqualification period. 
They would receive similar review and advice regarding their 
job search.
Job losers—other involuntarily separated workers
Leaving aside for the moment older workers forced to 
retire from their jobs, all other job losers include those laid 
off permanently for reasons which do not give rise to benefit
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disqualification. These include separations made because of 
business declines or shutdowns; staff reductions by non 
profit employers or government in response to budget cuts; 
worker dislocations resulting from technological or 
organizational changes, plant relocation, or other structural 
changes in industry; and discharges of employees because of 
unsatisfactory performance on the job. Some business 
declines may be temporary or seasonal, and workers laid off 
may have good prospects for rehire by their former 
employers even though not given a specific assurance of 
recall. An indistinct line separates such workers from those 
placed on a temporary but indefinite layoff.
Under the proposed system, all job losers in this category 
who can satisfy the minimum qualifying requirements would 
be entitled to tier 1 UI benefits, provided they also meet all 
the usual conditions of availability for work, registration 
with the employment service, regular reporting to file claims, 
and active search for work. At an early stage (within the first 
few weeks of filing), a brief diagnosis of reemployment pro 
spects would be made to classify these workers into two 
groups: the job ready and the less readily employable 
jobseekers.
The job ready. These are workers who have viable skills 
and experience that are in demand in the local job market, 
and who have reasonable prospects of finding new suitable 
jobs in the next 8 to 10 weeks. In some cases, they may 
already have located jobs that will start during this period 
and therefore may be treated as workers on temporary, short 
term layoffs. Others should be urged to use any job search 
services or techniques that could be helpful, both within and 
outside the public employment office. If job search con 
tinues for more than 8 to 10 weeks, the worker's job pro 
spects should be reviewed and reevaluated. The worker may 
need more intensive job search help, particularly with regard 
to search methods, or some supportive counseling if there
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appear to be any personal impediments to the job search. As 
appropriate, the worker should be advised to consider 
whether job expectations are too high in the light of current 
labor market conditions. It may be too early to press for 
lower expectations if the worker is still considered "job 
ready," but the idea could be suggested at this stage. 
Refusal, without good cause, to take a suitable job that is of 
fered or to follow up on a referal to such a job would be 
grounds for a disqualification from UI benefits. Evidence of 
unreasonable restriction on availability for work or inade 
quate pursuit of a job would also be grounds for benefit 
suspension.
A job-ready worker who exhausts tier 1 benefits could file 
and qualify for tier 2. Once beyond the short term range of 
the UI program, a more intensive review would be made of 
the worker's job prospects, job search, and other service 
needs. The worker's situation should be reassessed about 
every two months, and more frequently if warranted. A 
definite job search plan should be prepared and im 
plemented, or an earlier plan reevaluated. Some lowering of 
job expectations may be urged at this time and pressed 
harder if the job search remains unsuccessful. The approach, 
however, should be positive and reasonable in the light of 
current conditions of the labor market; there must be no 
harassment of the claimant. If the job market outlook is 
temporarily bleak, the jobseeker could be encouraged to 
consider taking temporary, including part-time, work until 
prospects improve, if such employment is available and 
feasible. The claimant would not be required to take such 
employment while still drawing tier 2 benefits, but could be 
increasingly pressed to do so as time goes on.
If unemployment continues beyond the 26th week of 
benefits, the worker may file and qualify for tier 3 benefits, 
but the conditions would become more demanding. If the 
worker continues to be considered "job ready" that is, his
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or her skills and experience are still viable in the labor 
market the problem is probably one of a temporary but 
prolonged recession. At the time the claimant files for tier 3 
benefits, job readiness should be reconfirmed. If not con 
firmed, the worker may then be a candidate for vocational 
adjustment service (training, etc.) and, in general, treated as 
a less readily employable jobseeker. If still job ready but a 
victim of recession, the worker can be referred to temporary 
jobs, including part-time work, if available, even if such 
employment falls outside the usual line of work and 
somewhat below the usual earnings experience. The jobs 
must be suitable and reasonable in other respects, however. 
They may include temporary public service jobs established 
during recession periods. Failure to accept such employment 
without good cause would disqualify the worker from fur 
ther UI.
Job-ready unemployed workers who wish to explore 
possibilities for retraining or other adjustments through 
public programs should be given every consideration possi 
ble. If appropriate training and resources are available, they 
should have access to them as long as it is clear that they are 
unlikely to become reemployed during the period of the 
training and that the training would enhance future 
reemployment prospects. It may be reasonable for 
unemployed workers to utilize a period of unfavorable 
reemployment prospects to improve their job capacity 
through training. Such efforts toward upgrading should be 
encouraged and supported. While in training, workers may 
be eligible to receive training allowances to supplement their 
UI or UA benefits.
The less employable jobseeker. These job losers are either 
structurally unemployed workers whose skills or experience 
are no longer in demand in the local labor market, or 
marginal workers with few or no vocational skills or with
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other employability impairments. If eligible, they could 
receive UI (or UA if not eligible for UI).
Within the first three weeks of unemployment, the 
worker's job prospects and vocational improvement needs 
would be diagnosed and evaluated, and appropriate plans 
drawn with regard to job search and training or rehabilita 
tion. The job search counselor's views of the job outlook 
and vocational limitations would be discussed thoroughly 
and frankly with the unemployed worker. The counselor 
could encourage the worker to consider seeking jobs quite 
different from those previously held and to accept lower 
wages, if necessary, to get started on a new line of work. If a 
training course is available and appropriate, the worker 
should be informed of it and encouraged to undertake it. If 
some other type of rehabilitative measure seems indicated, 
such as relocation or even some medical therapy to reduce a 
handicap, that too should be suggested, along with informa 
tion about the assistance available to enable the worker to 
take that step. In general, the objective is to give the worker 
a clear explanation of the probable employment limitations 
so that a realistic view can develop of what to expect and 
what course to follow to improve employability.
While on tier 1, the claimant would not have to follow the 
counselor's suggestions with regard to broadened job search, 
or to undertake suggested training or other adjustment, since 
it must be recognized that the counselor's diagnosis is not in 
fallible. This policy would apply especially for a worker af 
fected by a structural dislocation but who feels that there 
may still be some demand for his or her skills and experience. 
If, as time goes on, the results of the job search seem indeed 
to confirm the negative outlook, then the worker should be 
pressed harder to accept the steps recommended. There 
should be close monitoring of the worker's job search activi 
ty and perhaps several counseling reviews during the first 
three months of unemployment.
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Once beyond tier 1, the unemployed worker who, without 
good reason, resists consideration of the suggested ad 
justments should be cautioned that such an attitude may 
jeopardize eligibility for continued UI protection. If 
qualified for tier 2, the worker would be paid these benefits 
with the understanding that payment could be suspended in 
case of a refusal to accept offers of, or referrals to, different 
types of jobs or jobs at lower wages than earned previously. 
If an opportunity for appropriate training or some other 
rehabilitative measure is refused without good cause after 
starting to draw tier 2 benefits, the claimant could be dis 
qualified for a period of time. A second disqualification on 
these grounds would terminate any further UI benefit rights. 
The same conditions would apply during receipt of tier 3 UI 
(or of UA).
Job leavers
Workers who voluntarily quit their jobs without good 
cause and file for UI or UA benefits would be treated in the 
same manner as those who lose their jobs because of miscon 
duct. A period of benefit suspension would apply, after 
which they could draw benefits if unemployed and otherwise 
eligible. They would then be treated about the same as in 
voluntarily separated workers, except that the reason for 
quitting would be kept in mind for any clues to job search 
needs or weak labor force attachment.
Pensioners
Under present federal law, workers may not be forced to 
retire from a job before age 70. Most retire earlier in accor 
dance with collectively bargained agreements or by in 
dividual choice. Some workers who go on a pension file for 
UI benefits. Those who retire voluntarily face the same dis 
qualification as applies for anyone who voluntarily quits the 
job retirement is not "good cause." Retirees normally
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have no difficulty meeting the base-period qualifying re 
quirements for UI, but they must also be able to work, 
available for work, and actively seeking new employment. 
Under the JSS, eligible retirees who are unemployed and 
seek work could qualify for and draw tier 1 benefits provided 
they meet the current "able and available" conditions.
Federal UI law now requires states to reduce the weekly UI 
benefit amount by the prorated weekly amount of any retire 
ment pension received by the claimant, including a social 
security pension, to which a base-period employer has con 
tributed. 2 Most states previously applied a pension reduc 
tion, though not for social security. Under the proposed new 
UI structure, the states would be left free to apply their own 
rules for tier 1 and tier 2. In tier 3, the federal rule would ap 
ply.
Because of their age, pensioners may have above-average 
difficulty in finding employment, especially employment 
that is equivalent or similar to their prior jobs. This factor 
should be taken into account in a diagnosis of the claimant's 
reemployment prospects and in developing a job search plan, 
both to be prepared during the first few weeks of filing. Such 
workers should be urged at this early stage to broaden the 
range of "suitable" jobs they will seek. Considering the 
worker's age and receipt of a retirement pension, genuine at 
tachment to the labor force should receive special scrutiny. 
Inadequate job search and unreasonable restrictions on 
availability for work, including unjustifiably rigid insistence 
on defining "suitable work" as only that equivalent to the 
prior job and wage level, would be grounds for disqualifica 
tion from UI for a specified period.
Following exhaustion of tier 1 benefits, these workers may 
qualify for further benefits. The conditions and job services
2. The federal pension reduction requirement allows states to take account of the claim 
ant's contributions, if any, to the pension in determining the amount of the reduction.
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applicable would be similar to those described for other job 
losers except that, in general, pensioner claimants must be 
willing to accept a wider range of jobs, including those pay 
ing lower wages, sooner than other job losers. The required 
reduction of the weekly benefit amount for pensions receiv 
ed, applicable in all states for tier 3, is designed to make 
lower-paying jobs more attractive when compared to the 
reduced UI benefit.
Unemployed Persons—Not Previously 
or Recently Employed
For the most part, this category of the unemployed 
presents job search problems that differ from those of 
unemployed workers with recent job experience. New en 
trants and reentrants to the labor force usually seek work on 
their own and rely heavily on the suggestions of relatives and 
friends, and most succeed in finding employment this way. 
Others make use of specialized services or organizations that 
have developed to meet their particular needs. These include, 
for example, school vocational and placement offices for 
students who have completed their schooling, and agencies 
that cater to the job search needs of women who have 
devoted their prior years to homemaking and child rearing 
and now want paid employment. If low income is a problem, 
such jobseekers may qualify for employment and training 
services available through local GET A programs. New en 
trants and reentrants to the labor force are entitled to register 
at the Employment Service and the ES can advise them 
where to obtain specialized assistance beyond what it can of 
fer itself.
Reentrants
Under JSS, some reentrants may meet the minimum quali 
fying requirements for UI on the basis of employment early
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in the base period. If so, it would be necessary to learn about 
the circumstances of the last job separation to determine 
eligibility for benefits. If the circumstances were disqualify 
ing (a voluntary quit or a misconduct discharge, etc.), a 
period of benefit suspension would apply. The fact that the 
worker had dropped out of the labor force for some time 
would call for careful examination of the reasons for 
withdrawal and return. If the reentrant is eligible to draw 
benefits, the benefit reviewer must be alert to any recurrence 
of similar circumstances that may affect the individual's cur 
rent availability for work. Apart from these considerations, 
reentrants who draw UI would be treated the same as other 
job losers. The treatment would also be the same for reen 
trants who receive UA instead of UI.
Reentrants who do not qualify for UI or UA may signify 
their return to the labor force by registering for work at the 
public employment office. As applicants, they would be en 
titled to various job services. The type and extent of job 
search assistance rendered would take account of such con 
siderations as how far back the last employment was; 
whether it was permanent, temporary, or intermittent 
employment; whether it was full time or part time; and the 
type of employment now sought. Apart from need for 
assistance, the extent of job service provided would depend 
also on the degree to which current attachment seems perma 
nent and strong.
New entrants
Job applicants with no prior work experience would not be 
eligible for UI or UA, but they would be entitled to job ser 
vices. The extent of job services provided would be guided by 
the new entrant's reasons for entering the labor force, the 
type of work sought, and the temporary or permanent nature 
of the individual's current attachment.
3 8 Treatment of Clientele
Since most new entrants are teenagers, the job search help 
they need is quite special, particularly for those whose educa 
tion has been deficient or incomplete, or who suffer from 
other kinds of deprivation and discrimination. The extreme 
ly high rates of minority youth unemployment in our cities is 
well-known and potentially explosive. In the past, the ES has 
coped with the job search needs of youth through specialized 
counseling and other services. In more recent years, youth 
employment and training programs have proliferated within 
CETA. Unemployed youths who apply to the JSS for help in 
seeking their first jobs, or first regular jobs, would be 
directed to those services, whether within JSS or CETA or 
elsewhere, that offer the most appropriate course of 
assistance.
Underemployed Workers
Workers on temporarily reduced work schedules
Workers placed temporarily on a reduced work schedule 
may be eligible for partial UI for a limited period under the 
JSS. While drawing partial benefits, they would not be re 
quired to register at the employment service or to seek other 
full-time employment although they would be entitled to do 
so and to have access to appropriate job services if they wish.
If the reduced work schedule continues beyond the period 
during which partial benefits are payable, affected workers 
should be encouraged to register for full-time employment. 
If they decide voluntarily to leave their jobs at this time to 
search for full-time work, they would not be disqualified 
from UI, since the prolonged reduced work schedule can be 
regarded as good cause for quitting. If they are again offered 
full-time work by their former employers and they refuse, 
without good cause, to return to those jobs, they would be 
disqualified from drawing UI benefits.
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Workers seeking other employment
Underemployed full-time workers would not be eligible to 
receive any UI or UA. They would, however, be entitled to 
register with the employment service and receive all ap 
propriate assistance in seeking better jobs. The question may 
arise as to whether they are better off quitting their present 
jobs so that they can devote more time to seeking new work. 
In counseling underemployed workers on this question, great 
care should be taken to avoid recommending that they leave 
their jobs unless circumstances clearly warrant such action. 
The pros and cons of doing so should be thoroughly ex 
plored along with new job prospects. Underemployed 
workers should also be informed that quitting because of job 
dissatisfaction or underemployment could result in a benefit 
disqualification, although it may not in all cases. For exam 
ple, if an unemployed worker had taken a job less suitable to 
his or her skills and experience during a recession while 
waiting for better job opportunities to open up in the usual 
field of work, that worker should not be disqualified for 
quitting to seek such work when prospects improve. Workers 
who quit because of underemployment would be allowed to 
take advantage of appropriate training or other vocational 
adjustment measures that may be available.

IV. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
How well the JSS responds to the job search needs of its 
clients depends on the scope of its employment services and 
the care with which they are applied in individual cases. Not 
much that is especially new is suggested in the way of par 
ticular kinds of services offered. What is new is the greater 
concentration of effort to bring the available services to bear 
on the individual jobseeker so as to maximize possibilities 
for suitable reemployment.
By and large, JSS clients are experienced workers between 
jobs. Their unemployment is temporary and expected to be 
limited in duration. Most return to employment without the 
help of the public employment service, although they 
generally must register at the ES if they receive income sup 
port.
During the last 15 to 20 years, the ES in most places paid 
less attention than previously to the job search needs of UI 
claimants, who are experienced workers for the most part. 
Early in the 1960s, the ES worked to develop a more in 
dependent image for itself as a general manpower agency, 
rather than one that served primarily as an adjunct to UI. 
Separation of ES from UI took place widely at local levels, 
both physically and operationally, making the servicing of 
UI claimant needs more difficult and less likely. The Man 
power Development and Training Act of that period expand 
ed the broader manpower responsibilities of the ES, leading 
it further away from the specific needs of UI claimants. As
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the 1960s wore on, the consequences of that neglect were not 
very apparent, since unemployment declined to very low 
levels. The focus shifted to the treatment and elimination of 
poverty through training and work experience.
The antipoverty programs of the 1960s created new 
responsibilities and priorities for the ES, drawing it more 
heavily into dealing with the employment and training needs 
of the poor the "disadvantaged" and the unskilled who 
had little or unstable work experience, or no work experience 
at all. In the process, the ES veered from its goal of serving 
as a general manpower agency. The organization and 
reorganizations at the federal level of the administration of 
manpower policies and programs, and associated planning 
and budgeting functions, did not coincide well with state 
agency arrangements. Difficulties and confusions resulted at 
the local levels, along with tensions between the state and 
federal agencies responsible for the ES. Nor were additional 
ES responsibilities at the local level matched by sufficient 
added resources. The ES, consequently, was unable to carry 
on all of its functions satisfactorily and it drew increasing 
criticism for its perceived shortcomings.
With the enactment of CETA, the thrust of the 1970s 
shifted towards local control and organization of employ 
ment and training services independent of the state ES agen 
cies. To a great extent, the ES was thereby displaced from 
the mainstream of this activity. Lack of coordination bet 
ween the ES and CETA agencies became a major problem. 
Meanwhile, UI administrators experimented with ways of 
their own to identify and provide for the needs of claimants 
for job search assistance in the absence of adequate ES atten 
tion in this area.
Serious unemployment reappeared in the 1970s, making 
more insistent the concerns with UI claimant needs as well as 
with benefit eligibility issues. The principal response in re-
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cent years has been the national effort to implement, within 
UI operations, the Eligibility Review Program. 1 (This pro 
gram's title is misleading since it also is intended to cover 
assistance to claimants in their job search.) The ES has had 
little or no involvement in this effort.
With regard to the CETA-ES coordination issue, the pro 
posed JSS takes the view that the role of the ES should be 
more sharply defined as one that deals with the experienced 
unemployed, with workers normally employed on a regular 
basis but who are temporarily jobless. CETA's concentra 
tion is on the inexperienced jobseeker, on the unskilled, on 
those with the more severe impediments to employability. 
The rationale for distinguishing between these two sets of 
clients in this manner is that the type of treatment and ser 
vices required are generally different. The distinction is not 
always clear-cut; some overlap is inevitable. For the most 
part, however, the distinction can be made without much 
difficulty. Where overlap does occur, coordination between 
ES and CETA remains necessary. Some JSS clients may 
benefit by participation in CETA programs and should have 
access to them. CETA clients, in turn, may in time gain a 
more established position in the labor force so that subse 
quent unemployment may bring them under the JSS. 
Moreover, ES knowledge of the broader labor market could 
be valuable to CETA clients at some time and should be 
available to their benefit.
Since experienced unemployed workers are likely to 
receive UI, the JSS would restore the ES to its earlier, closer 
association with the UI program. Indeed, the coordination 
of UI and ES in serving the individual becomes more central 
than ever. The various kinds of employment services used to 
help bring about the unemployed worker's reemployment 
are described separately below. They are, however, to be
1. See footnote 1, ch. III.
44 Employment Services
brought together in an appropriate blend for the individual 
jobseeker under the direction of the job search counselor.
Placement Services—The Labor Exchange Function
The placement operation of the ES matching jobseekers 
and job openings has been seen right along as its central 
function and main justification. Each year, ES offices 
throughout the country place several millions of workers in 
jobs. The quality and scope of placements vary widely. In 
some areas, the ES labor exchange function is an important 
force in the labor market; in others, it is not. Overall, the ES 
accounts for only a limited fraction of all hirings that occur. 
That result should not be surprising. Employers are not re 
quired to fill their jobs this way, nor are workers compelled 
to seek jobs through the ES. The prevailing preference is for 
a free labor market. The ES objective is to help make that 
market operate more effectively and fairly, not to control it.
A good volume of placement activity is important. The 
more job orders the ES can fill, the better does it serve the 
unemployed. If the ES demonstrates to employers that it can 
supply qualified workers for their labor needs, more 
employers will turn to it. Workers will also look to the ES for 
jobs if the openings listed are for desirable jobs. Successful 
placements can generate increased success on both sides. Too 
often, however, the ES refers applicants to job openings 
without adequate preparation to be sure that the match is 
right and that the job is still open. Employer expectations 
can be excessive for the existing labor market. It is important 
that the jobs listed offer realistic wages and working condi 
tions. Job applicants must also be realistic in their expecta 
tions. Close counseling of unemployed workers can go far to 
help assure a reasonable outlook.
Another problem that has emerged over the years that af 
fects ES-employer relations concerns employer apprehen-
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sions about the enforcement of public policies to promote 
equal employment opportunity and affirmative action to 
achieve it. The ES has certain responsibilities relating to 
these policies with respect to the job orders it takes and the 
workers it refers. Application of the rules in a cold, 
bureaucratic manner can create employer resentment and 
resistance to using the ES. On the other hand, in a positive 
and cooperative atmosphere, employers can benefit from 
working with the ES to ensure that their hiring practices are 
fair and meet equal employment opportunity objectives. In 
the final analysis, however, it is the quality of the workers 
referred to jobs that determines satisfactory service to 
employers.
Mandatory listing of all job openings has been proposed 
as a means of strengthening the ES placement function. 
Employers who supply goods and services under contract to 
the federal government are now required to list all their job 
openings with the ES. Little information is available about 
the use and effectiveness of such listing. Expanded man 
datory listing does not seem desirable unless its value can be 
substantiated. A better course would be to attract more job 
listings by making more quality placements.
Similarly, not all jobseekers should be required to register 
with the ES, and no one proposes such a policy. Of course, 
those who receive UI or other public income support general 
ly must register, although even here there are exceptions. 
Other jobseekers are less likely to apply to the ES for place 
ment or other services. More of them should be encouraged 
to do so, including workers currently employed but who 
believe they are underemployed. Upgrading of the work 
force is a legitimate goal of the ES, but one that has been 
neglected. Some employers may not appreciate increased 
mobility for their workers, and some unions prefer a fairly 
fixed or limited labor supply in their trades. Employers in 
general, however, would benefit by having more access to ex-
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perienced and better skilled workers. Upward movement of 
such workers also creates more opportunity in vacated jobs 
for the less experienced and less skilled jobseekers. There is 
considerable unfilled demand for certain categories of skilled 
workers. 2 The best supply is presently employed workers 
who have the desired skills or who can easily develop them. 
Thus, upgrading could contribute to productivity improve 
ment, a significant current economic goal.
Stress placed on the ES placement function can be over 
done. Federal grants to the state agencies to cover their ES 
administrative costs emphasize placements in the budget 
allocation formula used. The effect is to encourage quantity 
rather than quality of placements. Moreover, other impor 
tant services that do not necessarily lead to ES placements 
and that may be more difficult to account for adequately for 
budget purposes may be underfinanced and underempha- 
sized as a result. The budget process should not distort the 
blend of services needed to promote reemployment, whether 
achieved directly through the agency's placement function or 
through some other means. A worker who finds a job on his 
own as the result of receiving some counseling and job search 
advice should be regarded as much a success for the agency 
as is a direct placement. Workers should be encouraged to 
look for jobs on their own and not to rely entirely on ES job 
listings. Other services are therefore important to broaden 
the job search.
Labor Market Information
The ES has the basis for considerable intelligence about 
the character and dynamics of local labor markets. State 
employment security agencies have detailed data about
2. Even during the 1980 recession, there were serious shortages of skilled workers. See 
"Who's Minding the Lathe?", an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1980 
concerning the shortage of machinists.
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monthly employment levels by local area, by industry, and 
even by individual employer, all available from quarterly 
reports employers submit with their UI tax returns. These 
reports also indicate the total wages paid out each quarter 
and, in most states, list all employees and their quarterly 
earnings. UI operations generate data about the weekly 
levels of initial claims, indicating new unemployment, and of 
continued claims filed, the basis of the insured unemploy 
ment count. These data are also available by local area. 
Similarly detailed information derives from ES opera 
tions the number of active job applicants, listed job open 
ings, referrals, placements, etc. Beyond regular operating 
data, much more information can be drawn from agency 
records about the characteristics of workers, UI claimants, 
and job applicants, and their employment and unemploy 
ment experience over a period of years. To one degree or 
another, the state agencies do collect and analyze such infor 
mation. Local labor market analysts exploit the data for 
their areas and keep in close touch with events and trends af 
fecting employment and wages on the local scene. While not 
all the unemployed are reflected in agency records, most of 
the experienced unemployed are. Nearly all wage and salary 
employment is reflected, since coverage by UI is almost 
universal. Local area estimates of total unemployment help 
account for the probable size of the noninsured segments.
This rich array of data and its analytical potential makes 
the state agency the obvious source of local labor market in 
formation. The degree of exploitation of the data varies con 
siderably by state and by area, depending on the emphasis 
and resources devoted to this activity and the skills of the 
analysts. Overall, the data contribute heavily to general 
economic analysis and policy planning at national and state 
levels. They are key to state and local planning for GET A 
programs. Within the context of the primary objectives of
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the JSS, however, the data's importance lies in how they can 
help serve the job search needs of individual workers. 3
Much has been done in organizing the available informa 
tion in imaginative ways so as to illuminate for jobseekers 
and job search counselors what is known about jobs and 
working conditions in the local labor market. 4 Unemployed 
workers themselves may know a good deal about employ 
ment conditions in their particular occupations, especially if 
they have worked in recent years for different employers in 
the area. Many, however, are not so knowledgeable. Good 
labor market information is vital to their job search. It is im 
portant that the information be as specific and current as 
possible. The task of maintaining adequate intelligence 
centers on the local analyst, but other staff can also con 
tribute to that effort. Local ES office personnel who deal 
directly with employers and jobseekers pick up bits and 
pieces of information that can enlarge understanding of cur 
rent conditions if brought together with other data. Involved 
staff needs to be highly sensitized to the opportunities their 
experience affords for improving local labor market infor 
mation.
The ways in which labor market information can be 
shaped and applied to be of most use to individual 
jobseekers have not been adequately explored or developed. 
Under the JSS, increased counseling to assist individual job 
search would require more development in this area. An im 
portant task of the labor market analyst would be to educate
3. For a full description of the data drawn from UI operations and their uses, see "Insured 
Unemployment Data" by Saul J. Blaustein in "Data Collection, Processing, and Presenta 
tion: National and Local," Appendix, Volume II, to Counting the Labor Force, a report of 
the National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Washington, DC, 
September 1979.
4. An excellent example of possibilities along these lines is the Job Hunter's Guide to 
Arizona, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Phoenix, AZ, October 1980. Similar 
guides are now available for Hawaii and Nevada.
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job search counselors about the information available and 
how it can be used in their work. In time, no doubt, good 
counselors will themselves determine how best to use the in 
formation. While benefit reviewers may be more concerned 
about the UI claimant's continuing eligibility under the law, 
they should also have some knowledge of and appreciation 
for current labor market information. It can help them 
evaluate more wisely the genuineness of the claimant's job 
search and attachment, and also whether the claimant needs 
more or closer job search counseling.
Diagnostic and Counseling Services
While diagnosis of the job search needs and employment 
prospects of unemployed workers may be more art than 
science, past experience and various demonstration projects 
in recent years indicate that reasonable diagnosis is feasible 
and operationally useful in many, if not most, cases even at 
the time the individual first registers for work. Moreover, the 
process stands to gain in effectiveness as improvements ac 
cumulate in labor market information, in data about the 
employability of jobseekers, and in the ability to collate the 
two through increasingly sophisticated and computerized 
analysis. 5 Since the diagnostic process is not infallible, 
periodic reassessment of the jobseeker's situation is 
necessary when unemployment continues, especially where 
that reassessment may carry implications for income support 
eligibility.
5. For evidence and discussion of the application of diagnostic classification to UI 
claimants, see: David W. Stevens, Assisted Job Search for the Insured Unemployed 
(Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 1974), p. 
35 ff; Paul L. Burgess and Jerry L. Kingston, Unemployment Insurance, the Job Search 
Process and Reemployment Success (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, June 1974) 
and David Stevens, Unemployment Insurance Beneficiary Job Search Behavior: What is 
Known and What Should Be Known for Administrative Planning Purposes, UI Occasional 
Paper Series No. 77-3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, 1977).
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As noted in chapter III, except for those on a temporary 
layoff, all unemployed workers who file for UI or UA under 
JSS would receive an initial diagnosis of their reemployment 
prospects within a few weeks after first filing and registering 
for work with the ES. The diagnosis would be based primari 
ly on information supplied by each worker on UI and ES 
forms covering work experience, reasons for job separa 
tions, skills, education, training, and other facts relevant to 
job search, and on current labor market information. As a 
result of the diagnosis, the worker would be classified as 
"job ready" or "less readily employable."
The local JSS office would notify workers who are job 
ready that they should actively seek work in their usual oc 
cupations, since employment prospects seem favorable. The 
notice should invite them to make use of ES facilities and job 
search aids that are available. It may repeat some informa 
tion provided when they first filed for benefits or registered 
at the ES, but a formal communication after a few weeks 
would serve to emphasize the importance of active job search 
and to encourage further search. It might also indicate that if 
no job is found by a specified date, the worker should ar 
range for a meeting with a job search counselor to discuss 
methods for seeking work and any problems being en 
countered. If the worker does not take the initiative to ar 
range a meeting shortly after the date indicated, the office 
should do so if the worker is still filing for benefits.
Jobseekers who are diagnosed as less readily employable 
in their usual jobs, or who have had problems finding or 
holding jobs before, should be scheduled for a meeting with 
a job search counselor within two or three weeks of first fil 
ing for benefits. The nature of the discussion at this meeting 
is covered in chapter III (see section on the less employable 
job seeker). The counselor should summarize the content of 
the discussion, including any job search plan or other action 
agreed to, and send a copy to the worker and to the benefit
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reviewer assigned to the individual. The benefit reviewer 
would then be responsible for following up with the claimant 
if the latter is still filing for benefits about a month to six 
weeks later.
If unemployment continues that long, the benefit reviewer 
would call in the claimant to go over the results of his or her 
recent job search activity. The reviewer would determine 
whether the job search counselor should reassess the 
worker's prospects and consider other possible steps to take. 
When unemployment lasts a long time, a periodic review 
would normally take place about every six to eight weeks and 
must occur when the claimant files for a new tier of UI 
benefits or for unemployment assistance. The review process 
should stress the positive job search objective and not begin 
primarily as an attempt to determine if the claimant is 
avoiding employment or is not looking for work with ap 
propriate diligence. The latter information may well emerge 
from the discussion and lead to a benefit disqualification, 
but that result is not the initial purpose of the process.
Whether and how often the job search counselor 
reassesses the worker's situation or classification would de 
pend on the individual's circumstances and labor market 
conditions. For example, any one or more of the following 
developments may occasion a reassessment:
a. The job-attached worker may find that the layoff has 
become permanent or indefinite rather than temporary 
and short term;
b. The labor market may deteriorate because of a slump 
in business or some other factor which eliminates 
favorable job prospects;
c. Labor market information available at the previous 
assessment may have been inadequate, incorrect, or 
misinterpreted;
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d. The worker's personal circumstances may have chang 
ed so as to place obstacles in the path of the job search, 
or they previously were not accurately reported or were 
misinterpreted.
A worker classified as job ready may have difficulty find 
ing a job in his or her usual employment. Staff should be 
alert to possibilities for broadening the worker's range of 
search by including job possibilities that are not the usual 
line of work but are close enough to be worth considering. 
When drawing benefits, the worker can be increasingly en 
couraged and even subjected to some pressure to broaden the 
search range, since failure to do so may jeopardize eligibility 
for benefits. The proposed revised structure for UI is design 
ed to accommodate a reassessment which requires greater 
flexibility in job search expectations.
With regard to the impact of a general recession on job 
prospects, it is necessary to recognize that until conditions 
begin to improve, job-attached or job-ready applicants may 
continue in these classifications for some time. Periodic 
reassessments should nevertheless be applied so as not to 
miss opportunities for broadening the job search when con 
ditions permit. Despite a general recession, favorable job 
prospects may exist in some areas or in some occupations.
As the process of diagnosis, review, and reassessment is 
systematically and assiduously applied, it will probably im 
prove and be refined further. Staff should become more 
skillful as they gain experience in applying the procedures. 
The labor market information available for the purpose may 
also improve as needs clarify. To the extent state UI offices 
are applying the procedures of the current Eligibility Review 
Program, staff experience will accumulate that can be 
adapted readily to the JSS procedures. The main difference 
is the greater intensity and greater emphasis on job search 
assistance in the JSS approach. The employment service
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should be more involved in the process. The job search 
counselor should serve as the link between the ES and the UI 
or UA programs.
Training and Other Vocational 
Adjustment Services
Unemployed workers classified as less readily employable 
reflect a variety of problems, each calling for different treat 
ment. In some cases, the problems and the remedies required 
are multiple. Despite progress with efforts to establish job 
readiness, these persons often remain only marginally attrac 
tive to employers as workers, especially in loose labor 
markets. Others may prove to be relatively unyielding to ad 
justment efforts. Where the obstacles are multiple and deep- 
rooted, the necessary motivation and perseverance may be 
impossible to sustain. At least at the outset, however, each 
case should be deemed susceptible of rehabilitation or ad 
justment. Continued unemployment after some training or 
other measures may be due as much to inadequate or inap 
propriate treatment of the individual's problems, or to very 
limited demand for labor at the time, as it is to his or her own 
intractability.
It is useful to group the less employable jobseekers into 
two categories. One includes workers with considerable 
employment experience, with well-established labor force at 
tachment, but who for one or more reasons have difficulty in 
finding adequate employment. The other group consists of 
less experienced workers or workers with unstable employ 
ment experience, with inadequate skills, or with physical, 
emotional, or social handicaps that reduce their employabili- 
ty.
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Long-experienced workers
Several types of problems can be identified which cause 
substantial difficulty and delay in regaining employment for 
jobseekers with good established work records. One is a defi 
cient understanding of how to look for work. Job search is 
rarely easy; it may be the hardest task a person faces. Know 
ing how to look does not come instinctively. Some 
jobseekers with viable skills and good experience who have 
not had to seek employment for many years may lack any 
knowledge about job search techniques. That may be their 
only obstacle to reemployment, yet it is a serious one. The 
JSS should be alert to this possibility, especially when 
reviewing the situations of workers initially classified as job 
ready but who do not regain employment in a reasonable 
period of time. Instruction about appropriate job search 
methods and adequate guidance during the search may be all 
the remedy needed. Considerable experience has ac 
cumulated with regard to job search methodology. Special 
training or workshops in search techniques and their applica 
tions have been shown to be valuable. The JSS should be 
prepared to supply such service when needed.6
Another problem is structural unemployment. Workers 
who lose their jobs because of a technological change in pro 
duction techniques which makes their skills obsolete, or who 
are phased out with the reduction, closure, or relocation of 
their employers' business activities, are examples of victims 
of structural unemployment. Unless their skills are transfer- 
rable to other fields, they may face long term unemploy 
ment. Some are older workers who suffer the additional 
burden of age discrimination. Retraining is a potential 
answer. Acquisition of new skills, or the updating or
6. For a discussion of developments in counseling and training unemployed workers in job- 
seeking techniques, see "Job Search Assistance: A Review," by Robert Wegmann in Jour 
nal of Employment Counseling, December 1979.
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upgrading of existing skills, can overcome the problem if 
there is a demand for those skills in the local labor market. 
Relocation may be an answer in other cases.
One of the difficulties in prescribing retraining and reloca 
tion is that the worker may be unwilling to accept so quickly 
the need for adjustment, especially if it means the possibility 
of lower earnings, a long delay in getting back on a regular 
job, or a disruptive and costly move. Structurally un 
employed workers who can benefit from training might be 
encouraged to move more quickly by offering certain incen 
tives. A supplemental training allowance, on top of the UI 
benefit, is one possibility; assurance of longer benefit protec 
tion to cover the training period and subsequent job search is 
another. 7 Arrangements might be made with employers for 
on-the-job training of such workers whereby lower earnings 
might be supplemented for a time by partial unemployment 
benefits. Financial assistance may be appropriate to help 
cover travel and relocation costs and might be supplied to 
claimants seeking a job in another area or moving to take a 
job.
Workers laid off because of the adverse effects of foreign 
competition are also structurally unemployed. Under provi 
sions of the Federal Trade Act of 1974, they may receive 
Trade Adjustment Allowances which substantially supple 
ment the UI weekly benefit and duration of benefits. They 
are also eligibile for various adjustment services. Other 
special programs provide similar benefits for structurally 
unemployed workers in certain industries. 8 It may be well to 
generalize on this more generous approach for all workers 
laid off for structural reasons, particularly if the added
7. Michigan provides an extension of UI duration for up to 18 more weeks of benefits to 
continue the compensation of recipients who are in approved training that lasts beyond the 
regular UI duration limit.
8. See footnote 5, ch. I.
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benefits are made available as inducements to encourage 
them to undertake adjustments more quickly.
Most training and related remedial measures are currently 
supplied through CETA-sponsored programs. Income and 
other requirements may bar entry for structurally 
unemployed workers. Moreover, their training needs may be 
quite different from those of the usual CETA program 
enrollees. JSS should arrange for training and other adjust 
ment services designed for the experienced unemployed who 
need assistance to maintain their viability in a changing labor 
market.
Some workers, after years of steady and satisfactory 
employment, run into difficulties because of emerging per 
sonal problems that may be unrelated to their vocational 
abilities but which interfere with their ability to perform on 
the job. They may lose their jobs as a result. Without some 
outside help, they may be unable to resolve their problems, 
which can include the onset of bad health, family instability, 
and emotional breakdown. Alcoholism and drug abuse are 
other examples which loom large. The JSS should work with 
employers to arrange referrals of such workers to communi 
ty agencies that can help in an effort to prevent the problem 
from getting out of hand and to forestall layoffs. If the 
worker does lose the job, the JSS should try to identify the 
problem and support efforts to resolve it. Where needed, 
some financial assistance should be available to help pay the 
costs of medical or counseling services obtained to deal with 
these problems.
Other less readily employable jobseekers
An important part of this category consists of unemployed 
youths, particularly those who recently graduated from 
school or left school before completion. Many eventually 
work their way into regular employment after some trial and
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error experience, and that is not necessarily an objectionable 
process. The process, however, is often disorganized, ineffi 
cient, and more prolonged than necessary. The problem is 
not so much a matter of finding jobs, but rather one of ob 
taining appropriate regular or stable employment which 
enables young workers to develop good experience and 
skills. They can usually work enough to meet the work or 
earnings qualifying requirements for UI and therefore enter 
the JSS in this way. In many instances, however, they are 
disqualified for UI because they quit jobs.
In the past, the public employment services have attempt 
ed to supply guidance in one way or another to ease the tran 
sition from school to work. The means employed include 
special counseling and placement services for youths, and the 
promotion of vocational guidance in the schools. These ef 
forts have been neither universal nor continuous. It is impor 
tant to build a strong, steady program of vocational 
guidance covering all senior and junior high schools and in 
volving a close active working relationship between JSS and 
school staff. Students should be exposed early and often to 
instruction about the realities of work, occupations, careers, 
and job search techniques. When youngsters do apply for 
help at a JSS office, the system should be prepared to work 
closely with them, on a long-range basis if necessary, until a 
pattern of regular, stable employment is established.
CETA training and work experience programs focus 
heavily on young people with the more difficult problems 
that are frequently associated with poverty and discrimina 
tion. Disadvantaged, ill-educated youths from poor 
households are especially in need of vocational preparation, 
and many CETA programs are designed for them. These in 
clude the Job Corps and newer programs authorized by the 
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 
1977. Low family income is usually a prerequisite, and a 
training allowance may be provided in some cases. Most
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young people who enroll in a CETA program do so directly, 
without first applying at the public employment office. 
Those who do apply at the ES and who may qualify for 
CETA should be referred to the CETA agency.
A somewhat similar set of employment problems exists for 
women who reenter the labor force after lengthy absence. 
Most find jobs on their own. Others may need some 
guidance or assistance in establishing a regular employment 
pattern. If they apply for benefits or services under the JSS, 
they should receive appropriate treatment. Special training 
or work-preparation programs are emerging more widely for 
homemakers planning to seek employment or who have 
worked part-time or sporadically and now want regular 
work. The JSS should refer them to such programs where 
they are available, or help to form one as needed. CETA 
may also be dealing with these needs, and the JSS should 
cooperate and participate in developing the appropriate ser 
vices, since not all the women who can benefit are eligible for 
CETA assistance.
Coordination with CETA would be especially important 
for JSS if the proposed unemployment assistance program is 
established. Women now on AFDC who are expected to be 
available for work would, in many cases, qualify for UA; 
some might qualify for UI after some work experience. As is 
now the case with WIN, the state agency would be responsi 
ble under JSS to supply or arrange for vocational adjustment 
assistance for these women to enhance their employability. 
Some training and other work experience programs provided 
through CETA could be used or adapted for the purpose. In 
addition to the lack of job skills and experience, non- 
vocationally-related personal problems are also likely to be 
present among this group. Poor health, emotional instabili 
ty, family disruption, alcoholism, unreliable child care ar 
rangements, and other difficulties may have to be treated 
before, or along with, vocational preparation. Some com-
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munity resources may be available to such individuals, and 
they should be encouraged to turn to them for help. Often 
those resources are limited or not accessible for the 
unemployed. JSS and CETA should seek expansion of and 
greater accessibility to such assistance.
The objective of WIN and related efforts is to bring such 
people into increasing self-support, weaning them away 
from welfare. "Graduation" to unemployment assistance or 
UI, after some job experience, may signify an important for 
ward step in the process. The JSS should be prepared to sup 
ply continuing guidance and remedial services in these cases 
until the worker becomes well-established and self- 
sustaining.
Another group of less readily employable jobseekers con 
sists of underemployed workers, particularly those who 
work part-year in seasonal jobs and who want year-round 
employment. Many draw unemployment benefits in the off 
season. The JSS would diagnose such benefit recipients for 
possible preparation for year-round jobs and encourage or 
even require them to undertake appropriate training or work 
experience as a condition for continued benefits.
Job Creation and Subsidized Employment
Although not assumed as a function of the JSS, the crea 
tion and funding of a large number of temporary public ser 
vice jobs has become, under CETA, a major strategy for 
alleviating long term structural and cyclical unemployment. 
CETA specifies essentially two types of public service 
employment. One (under Title II of the Act) emphasizes the 
work experience or training aspect of the job for structurally 
unemployed and other less readily employable jobseekers. 
The intent is to enable the individual placed in the job to 
move into regular employment as the result of the ex 
perience. The other type of public service employment (Title
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VI) supplies work opportunities during recession periods 
when normal jobs are temporarily curtailed. Instead of 
drawing income support for prolonged periods, the 
unemployed worker can use the time to render a productive 
public service that might not otherwise be performed. The 
scope and volume of public service employment may face 
restriction in coming years. 9
New jobs are also created for the unemployed in the 
private sector through federally funded expansion of public 
works concentrated in high-unemployment areas and during 
periods of heavy unemployment. Moreover, there are now 
special federal tax credits available under certain conditions 
to employers who hire persons from particularly disadvan- 
taged groups, such as low-income youth, Vietnam veterans, 
and handicapped individuals. 10 These credits represent a por 
tion of the wages paid to such workers. In addition, stronger 
efforts are being made in other ways to engage private in 
dustry more in dealing with long term and hard-core 
unemployment by developing more training and work ex 
perience opportunities in private sector jobs. 11
The major expansion in jobs for the unemployed during 
recent years of high unemployment has come in CETA- 
funded public service employment. By and large, JSS clients 
would not be likely to qualify for such jobs unless they have 
remained unemployed for a long period of time (for at least
9. Public service employment has become increasingly criticized as a countercyclical 
measure for coming on too late, for staying on too long, for substituting for state and local 
funding of regular government jobs instead of financing new jobs, for supporting un 
productive work, and for poor management. It is also criticized for being inadequate con 
sidering the large numbers of unemployed who are unable to find regular jobs in relatively 
good times as well as bad, and for an inadequate variety of types of work experience in jobs 
provided under Title II.
10. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program was established under the Revenue Act of 1978.
11. The efforts include support under Title VII of CETA for a Private Sector Initiatives 
Program (PSIP) and local Private Industry Councils to help plan and promote PSIP, and 
the increasing involvement of private sector employers in local employment service ad 
visory committees under the Job Service Improvement Program.
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15 weeks) and are from low-income households. When 
clients are eligible, the JSS should consider referrals to those 
jobs, as appropriate.
Working temporarily, even at something less rewarding or 
desirable than what the worker wanted or usually did, should 
be considered preferable to long term income support, pro 
vided it is useful work. Prolonged idleness may undermine 
the unemployed worker's self-respect and basic attachment 
to the labor force, as well as normal work habits and 
discipline. Created temporary employment of this nature 
provides the JSS with another means for protecting the 
security of workers as workers. With adequate advance plan 
ning, there is probably much in the way of worthwhile work 
that could be accomplished through this means that would 
not otherwise be done.
Recent welfare reform proposals also emphasize the crea 
tion of more public service jobs to assure the substitution of 
work for welfare for those able to work. This policy would 
operate to shift employable AFDC recipients into an increas 
ingly solid attachment to the labor force. Job security, rather 
than income security, would become the primary means for 
assuring their welfare. The establishment of an unemploy 
ment assistance program, as proposed under JSS, would 
carry this concept even further. Temporary public service 
and private sector jobs would serve as an important means 
for guiding UA recipients toward self-supporting regular 
employment.
Because of the widespread criticism of public service 
employment in recent years and the way the political climate 
has shifted toward less enthusiasm for that approach, more 
emphasis is likely to be given in the future to private sector 
initiatives. Broadening the present limited job tax credit pro 
gram or developing other types of public wage subsidies 
could aim at expanding on-the-job training or work ex-
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perience opportunities in private industry. That approach 
can enlarge the variety of training and experience beyond 
what is possible in public service jobs and enhance prospects 
for regular permanent employment in the private sector. 
Care must be taken to be sure that employers do not use the 
subsidies to replace regular workers by subsidized workers, 
comparable to the substitution effect encountered with 
public service employment.
V. THE THREE-TIER 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM
The elements of the Job Security System which would 
modify present arrangements most significantly are the in 
come support programs. Unemployment insurance would be 
substantially restructured and a new unemployment 
assistance program would be established. This chapter 
discusses the proposed reform of UI; chapter VI discusses 
UA.
The Present UI Structure
The existing federal-state UI system, now over 45 years 
old, has much the same basic framework with which it 
began. Each state has its own program defined by its own 
statutory provisions. The state is responsible for raising its 
own funds to finance the benefits it pays. State UI provisions 
specify the qualifying requirements, eligibility conditions, 
and the weekly amount and duration of benefits payable. 
Except for a few federal requirements applicable largely to 
eligibility rules, each state determines its own benefit provi 
sions. These vary considerably among states as a result. 
Federal UI law has more influence over state UI benefit 
financing, but even here each state has wide latitude in set 
ting UI tax rates and the level of reserves it maintains. In ef 
fect, federal law prohibits a state from setting its employer 
tax rates below 2.7 percent of taxable payrolls except on the
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basis of experience rating. 1 All states, therefore, provide 
experience-rated taxes, 2 but taxes on employers with similar 
experience can and do vary greatly among the states. The 
federal government has even more impact on the administra 
tion of the program, mainly because it finances ad 
ministrative costs through annual grants to the states out of 
revenues from the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUT) on 
employer payrolls. There are also a number of statutory 
federal requirements with which the states must comply in 
the administration of their laws.
Two important features have been added to the program's 
basic structure since it began. One is a provision for federal 
loans to states with exhausted benefit reserves to enable them 
to continue paying benefits. Repayable, interest-free ad 
vances may be obtained by such states from a federal loan 
fund accumulated out of FUT revenues. The borrowing state 
must repay after about two to three years, or have its debt 
reduced in annual installments through reductions in the tax 
credit its employers can take each year against the federal 
unemployment tax. 3 If the federal loan fund is insufficient to 
meet all needs, it may draw repayable advances from the 
U.S. Treasury. 4
The other added feature is the provision of extended 
benefits (EB) during periods of high unemployment. 
Enacted in 1970, the EB program provides for a 50 percent
1. A Federal Unemployment Tax (currently 3.4 percent), which applies to each covered 
employer's taxable payroll, may be offset by the amount of state UI tax the employer pays, 
up to 2.7 percent of payroll; if the employer pays less than 2.7 percent to the state, an addi 
tional tax credit is allowed against the federal tax to cover the difference (i.e., the full 2.7 
percent credit may be taken) if the state tax was reduced on the basis of the unemployment 
experience of the employer's work force.
2. Except for Puerto Rico, considered a "state" in the UI system.
3. See footnote 1 explaining the tax credit.
4. The federal loan fund accumulates up to a limit of $550 million, which was well short of 
needs in the mid-1970s.
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extension of the regular benefit duration payable to 
claimants under the state law, up to a 39-week maximum for 
regular benefits and EB combined. Extensions trigger on 
automatically when state or national insured unemployment 
rates exceed specified levels, and trigger off when they fall 
below those levels. Each state is responsible for financing 
half the costs of the EB it pays; the other half is financed by 
the federal government out of an account accumulated for 
the purpose from PUT revenues. If this account is depleted, 
as was the case in the mid-1970s, it is replenished by 
repayable U.S. Treasury advances. In effect, then, the ex 
isting federal-state UI system is a two-tiered program a 
basic tier of regular state benefits generally compensating up 
to the first 26 weeks of unemployment and, for those ex 
hausting regular benefits when unemployment is high, a sec 
ond tier of federal-state shared EB covering up to 13 addi 
tional weeks of unemployment to an overall maximum of 39 
weeks. 5
In 1971 and in 1974, Congress provided for temporary 
supplemental benefit programs for the recessions then in 
progress. While they lasted, these programs provided addi 
tional weeks of benefits for claimants who exhausted 
EB up to another 13 weeks under each program, and up to 
26 more weeks for a while during the later program, with 
overall potential maximums of 52 and 65 weeks of benefits. 
All the costs of these supplemental benefits in effect, a 
third tier were wholly federally financed, at first out of 
PUT revenues, but later from general revenues. These 
benefits were payable only in states where the insured 
unemployment trigger rate reached specified levels. During 
1980, Congress again considered but did not adopt a tem-
5. In most states, many claimants who exhaust regular benefits draw less than the 26 weeks 
maximum and therefore are entitled to fewer than 13 weeks of EB, i.e., less than 39 weeks 
in all, when EB is payable. Some states pay regular benefits for more than 26 weeks. During 
EB periods, the federal government pays half the cost of regular benefits paid after the 26th 
week the overall 39-week limit still applies in these states.
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porary third tier of federal supplemental benefits (FSB) for 
the current recession.
On the whole, the existing federal-state UI system has 
functioned well, at least until recent years when it ran into 
serious financial difficulties. The program has had and con 
tinues to have its weaknesses and inadequacies, but it has 
never failed to pay the benefits provided under the laws. 
Each year, UI helps to sustain the incomes of millions of 
jobless workers during periods of temporary unemployment. 
In many communities hit hard by unemployment, benefit 
outlays uphold the purchasing power needed to keep local 
business going and to help prevent further deterioration. 
After 45 years, UI has become generally well accepted as an 
important and necessary institution in our society.
Duration and Financing Problems 
and the National Commission
UI, however, does have its problems. The program has 
always been issue-prone, and controversy has swirled almost 
continuously about many of its features. Moreover, the 
economic setting in which it operates changes constantly. 
Without adequate evolution over a long period of time in 
response to such change, the program can grow less respon 
sive to current needs. Many observers feel that UI has not 
evolved enough over the years to avoid that result.
The severe recession of the mid-1970s jolted the UI system 
and left it in a good deal of financial disarray. Almost half 
the states exhausted their reserves and had to borrow from 
the federal loan fund. Total state borrowing reached to over 
$5.5 billion by the end of 1978, most of which had to be ad 
vanced to the system from general revenues. In addition, 
general revenue advances were needed to support federal EB 
and FSB costs. The system's outstanding obligations to the
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U.S. Treasury for all advances totaled about $12.5 billion in 
late 1980. About half the borrowing states repaid all of their 
loans by 1980 and others have repaid part. With another 
recession in progress, more financial difficulties threaten to 
compound the problem. Further borrowing by states has oc 
curred in 1980 and early in 1981. Outstanding state in 
debtedness totaled about $5 billion at the close of 1980. 6
The FSB extensions, which carried benefit duration 
beyond 39 weeks, and even beyond 52 weeks for a time, have 
raised serious questions in some quarters about the UI pro 
gram's integrity as a form of insurance against temporary 
unemployment. Use of general revenues to finance FSB 
breaks out of the traditional pattern of self-contained 
financing for UI which has been widely regarded as an im 
portant feature of the program's insurance character. These 
benefits were perceived by many observers more as welfare 
payments than as insurance benefits based on earned rights.
The program's problems, along with its financial crisis in 
the mid-1970s, combined to induce Congress to authorize, 
for the first time, a national commission devoted entirely to 
a study of the UI system and its problems. The National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) car 
ried out its comprehensive review of the program from early 
1978 through the summer of 1980. Its Final Report, of July 
1980, contains its findings, conclusions, and recommenda 
tions. The NCUC's recommendations are wide-ranging, 
covering all aspects of UI as well as some features of other 
programs bearing on UI, such as the public employment ser 
vice and special federal unemployment benefit programs for 
particular groups of workers, e.g., Trade Readjustment 
Assistance. The recommendations vary in the degree of
6. Information about state UI loans and general U.S. Treasury advances based on data 
supplied to the author by the Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Department of 
Labor's Employment and Training Administration.
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agreement they commanded among Commission members, 
ranging from unanimous to very narrow support.
Some observations are appropriate here about two areas 
of the Commission's work and recommendations those 
relating to benefit duration and to financing since these are 
two of the UI problem areas to which the proposed new 
three-tier program is addressed.
The Commission chose not to recommend alteration of 
the program's basic structure. It suggested that the states 
continue to be fully responsible for regular benefits up to at 
least 26 weeks maximum duration. A NCUC majority did 
support federal minimum benefit standards, however, in 
cluding one affecting the amount of base-period employ 
ment states may require to qualify for 26 weeks of regular 
benefits. This standard specifies that a state may not require 
a claimant to have more than 39 weeks of base-period 
employment (or an equivalent amount and spread of base- 
period earnings) to be eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. The 
Commission also urged a gradual reduction of the 39 weeks 
employment limit but did not specify how much lower it 
should be eventually. The initial level of the standard would 
eliminate the most extreme duration restrictions currently 
applicable in several states but would leave many states with 
large proportions of claimants qualifying for less than 26 
weeks of protection. In 1979, there were 27 states where 40 
percent or more of all eligible claimants could not qualify for 
26 weeks of benefits and 34 states where over half the 
claimants who exhausted regular benefits drew for less than 
26 weeks. 7 Adoption of the proposed standard would pro 
bably not alter these patterns much until the qualifying re 
quirement limit is reduced substantially.
The Commission also recommended retention of the trig 
gered EB program for high unemployment periods, carrying
7. Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1979, pp. 54 and 56.
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benefit duration to an overall maximum of 39 weeks. No 
change was suggested in the 50 percent extension of the in 
dividual claimant's regular benefit entitlement or in the 
federal-state sharing of EB costs. A few improvements were 
recommended in the EB trigger mechanism. The discussion 
of several other issues relating to EB did not lead to recom 
mendations for change.
The basic approach of using a statistical indicator to trig 
ger EB sometimes produces odd and arbitrary borderline 
results that may not be intended. Statistics on insured 
unemployment are not so precise or accurate as to assure 
that EB will always trigger on and off at the right time and in 
the right place. 8 Wide variation among and within states in 
the severity of unemployment has led to some questioning of 
the policy of EB payments triggering on nationwide, and 
even statewide, and to proposals to eliminate the national 
trigger and to trigger EB on a local basis. The NCUC was 
evenly divided on the former proposal and rejected the lat 
ter. Locally triggered EB seems not at all feasible because it 
poses extremely difficult technical problems of statistical 
measurement and administration. Another EB concern has 
been with the combined long duration of benefits that 
claimants with very limited base-period employment can 
receive in some states, e.g., qualifying for 39 weeks of 
benefits with 20 or fewer weeks of employment. The Com 
mission discussed but did not recommend a higher minimum 
qualifying requirement for EB.
A majority favored a permanent standby program of FSB, 
triggered on a national and state basis. The program would 
provide up to two additional segments, each equal to 50 per 
cent of the claimant's regular benefit entitlement and subject 
to a 13-week limit. Successively higher trigger thresholds
8. Seasonal adjustment of the state trigger rates, as recommended by the NCUC, would be 
an important improvement in this regard.
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would apply for each FSB segment, as compared with EB 
trigger thresholds, and the overall duration ceilings would be 
52 and 65 weeks, respectively. The FSB benefits would be 
wholly federally financed out of general revenues. There was 
less support for the second FSB segment and for paying FSB 
on a national triggered basis.
Commission majorities supported more change when it 
came to UI financing. Recommendations included increasing 
the federal taxable wage base, charging interest on loans 
made to the states from the federal loan fund, and advice to 
the states regarding the maintenance of solvent reserve 
funds. Another significant recommendation was to establish 
a reinsurance plan that would make grants to states from a 
nationally pooled fund to ease part of the very heavy cost 
burdens some states experience during recession periods. The 
Commission did not endorse any of the specific reinsurance 
plans that have been advanced, but it did indicate a few 
parameters which a majority favored. The plan was to be 
modest, financed by a fund accumulated out of FUT revenue 
allocations equal at first to no more than 0.1 percent of tax 
able payrolls each year. Reinsurance grants to eligible states 
would cover no more than 30 percent of defined excess costs, 
and less if accumulated reinsurance funds available for a 
given year were insufficient to meet the 30 percent level. To 
be eligible for a grant, a state's benefit costs for a given 
period must equal or exceed 2.7 percent of taxable payrolls.
The way a reinsurance plan defines excess cost or eligibili 
ty conditions for a grant tends to pit one group of states 
against another. Alternative definitions or conditions can 
have very different effects on which states qualify and for 
how much. The Commission's recommended minimum re 
quirement of a 2.7 percent cost rate would probably preclude 
a number of states from receiving grants because they always 
have had relatively low rates of insured unemployment and 
benefit costs. Those states object to having their employers
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contribute to a fund from which they are very unlikely to 
benefit. Under another approach, a minimum percentage in 
crease in benefit cost or insured unemloyment levels between 
one period and another would qualify a state for a grant 
regardless of the absolute level of these measures. High-cost 
states object to this idea because they may not be able to 
qualify on that basis. One proposed plan would combine 
both the absolute level of the insured unemployment rate 
and the percentage increase in order to broaden support 
among the states. Designing an adequate reinsurance plan 
that would command a broad political base among the states 
remains problematical.
Features of the Proposed Three-Tier Program
The proposed new UI structure would attack, directly, the 
duration and financing problems of the present UI program. 
First, the new program would not go beyond the 39th week 
of unemployment. Second, all UI benefits would be financed 
by state and federal employer payroll taxes with no resort to 
general revenues. The proposed financing arrangements 
would reduce the likelihood of state fund insolvency.
The proposed program is divided into three segments or 
tiers, each providing uniform potential duration of 13 weeks 
of benefits. Each tier is governed by different eligibility con 
ditions and financed by a different mix of state and federal 
taxes. The third tier, which carries benefit protection up to 
39 weeks, would be available at all times and would not be 
dependent on a triggering mechanism tied to the unemploy 
ment level.
The 39-week limit
The justification for the 39-week limit derives from the 
basic financing concept underlying UI in this country, the 
empirical experience regarding the adequacy of UI duration
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provisions, and the availability of other forms of assistance 
for those beyond the protection of UI.
A fundamental principle applying to UI in the United 
States is that its costs should be absorbed by business. By this 
approach, the costs are allocated to production and in turn 
subject to the discipline of the market-price system. Charg 
ing UI costs to employers also motivates them to minimize or 
avoid laying off their workers. The application of this princi 
ple explains the virtually exclusive reliance on employer 
payroll taxes to support the program and the experience 
rating of those taxes. 9 With such financing, some limit on the 
maximum potential liability of individual employers is ap 
propriate, and limiting benefit duration seems a reasonable 
means for accomplishing it. Also, a duration limit appears 
appropriate within this context in that, as unemployment 
continues for a very long time, the link between UI benefits 
paid as a matter of earned rights and the prior employment 
on which they are based becomes increasingly tenuous, and 
the benefits paid become less justifiable as the financial 
responsibility of employers.
The present UI program began modestly with respect to 
benefit duration out of fear of excessive costs. As it became 
clear that the program's financial base could support longer 
duration, states gradually raised their duration limits to 26 
weeks, some even beyond that level. The objective for the 
duration provision was that UI benefits should be payable 
long enough to carry the great majority of recipients through 
their unemployment. This view focuses attention on ex- 
haustees claimants whose unemployment lasts beyond the 
UI duration limit.
Historically, the tendency for claimants to exhaust 
benefits at given levels of unemployment has related closely 
to the statutory limits placed on benefit duration. As states
9. Only 3 states derive some revenues from employee taxes to help finance UI.
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improved their benefit duration provisions, the rate of ex 
haustion declined. Since 1960, when the national average 
potential duration of regular state benefits reached 24 weeks, 
about where it has remained, the national exhaustion rate 
has ranged between 18 and 38 percent, varying primarily by 
the rate of unemployment (table 2). Among the states, ex 
haustion rates vary over a wider range, reflecting variations 
in both the duration allowed and the rate of unemployment. 
Generally, the more restricted the duration allowed, the 
higher the exhaustion rate.
The regular state duration provisions, as a whole, carry a 
large proportion of claimants (about 75 to 80 percent) 
through their unemployment only when the insured 
unemployment rate has been about 3 percent or less. During 
the 1970s, unemployment was higher, and so was the number 
of exhaustions of regular benefits. During recession periods, 
EB comes into play, extending potential duration by half. 
During the 1970s, about 65 percent of claimants who drew 
EB exhausted those benefits. 10 At that rate, regular and EB 
duration combined appeared adequate to carry about 75 to 
80 percent of all UI recipients through their unemployment, 
even during periods of high unemployment. The combined 
limit of 39 weeks of benefits comes close to achieving the ob 
jective of carrying the great majority through their 
unemployment.
Even so, the numbers exhausting EB during the recession 
years of the mid-1970s were large 2.5 million in 1975, 2.4 
million in 1976, and 1.8 million in 1977 large enough to ex 
plain the FSB extensions during this period. The only alter 
native for EB exhaustees is welfare AFDC or state or local 
general assistance. These programs, however, are quite 
restrictive, so that many EB exhaustees who are in need of
10. Based on total final EB payments from 1970 to 1978 as a percent of first EB payments, 
1970 to mid-1978.
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Table 2
Potential Duration of Benefits, Exhaustion Rate, and Insured
Unemployment Rate under Regular State UI Programs
U.S. Averages, 1960-1978________________________
Average potential Insured
duration of regular Exhaustion unemployment
Year_____benefits (weeks)____rate1 (percent) rate2 (percent)
1960 24.0 26.1 4.7
1961 23.9 30.4 5.7
1962 23.9 27.4 4.3
1963 24.1 25.3 4.2
1964 24.2 23.8 3.7
1965 24.1 21.5 2.9
1966 24.2 18.0 2.2
1967 24.5 19.3 2.4
1968 24.3 19.6 2.2
1969 24.4 19.8 2.1
1970 24.6 24.4 3.4
1971 24.5 30.5 4.1
1972 23.8 28.9 3.0
1973 24.3 27.6 2.5
1974 24.4 31.2 3.4
1975
1976
1977
1978
24.3
24.0
24.1
24.5
37.8
37.8
33.4
26.8
6.1
4.4
3.7
2.8
SOURCE: Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1976, and An 
nual Supplements, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
1. Claimants receiving final payments in calendar year as a percent of claimants receiving 
first payments in a 12-month period ending 6 months earlier.
2. Insured unemployed workers as a percent of covered employment.
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further income support cannot qualify for welfare. AFDC is 
not available for families without dependent children and, in 
about half the states, for families in which both parents are 
present. Without an adequate back-up program for workers 
who need further support for a time, the pressures to extend 
UI beyond 39 weeks are almost irresistable during recession 
years. The UA program of the proposed JSS would relieve 
those pressures. The National Commission on Unemploy 
ment Compensation recommended the establishment of a 
UA program, although it also recommended FSB extensions 
beyond 39 weeks for recession periods.
Financing
Under the proposed UI program, the financing arrange 
ment for each tier would vary by the mix of state and federal 
responsibility, although all financing would rely on employer 
payroll taxes levied for the purpose. Presently, each state 
finances its regular UI benefits from its own UI reserve fund 
accumulated from experience-rated employer payroll taxes. 11 
EB costs are shared equally by state UI reserves and the 
federal UI trust fund account reserved for extended benefits. 
In about half the states, the state pools its share of EB costs 
among all its employers; the rest experience rate those costs. 
The federal share of EB costs is pooled nationally among all 
covered employers.
Under the proposed three-tier program, the states would 
be totally responsible for tier 1 costs and probably would 
continue to experience rate these costs. In the sense that ex 
perience rating reflects the notion that an individual firm 
bears the responsbility for the unemployment of its 
employees, the full experience rating of short term benefits is 
logical. Much unemployment is short term and more likely
11. Some added revenues are raised from employee taxes in three states; Puerto Rico does 
not experience rate.
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than longer term unemployment to be controllable, to some 
extent, by the employer. One objective of experience rating is 
to encourage employers to minimize unemployment; tier 1 is 
the most appropriate segment in which to concentrate that 
effect.
Tier 2 costs would be shared equally between state and 
federal UI reserve funds, as is now the case with EB costs. As 
unemployment moves beyond the short term range of tier 1, 
the responsbility of the individual firm for the unemploy 
ment of its employees grows more and more remote. Na 
tional pooling of half the costs of tier 2 benefits ack 
nowledges that the continued unemployment is less subject 
to employer control and more likely to be the result of 
broader forces that are multi-state or national in scope. The 
states would be able to choose between pooling or experience 
rating the state share of tier 2 costs, as is now the arrange 
ment for state EB costs.
An extension of the argument for increased pooling of tier 
2 costs leads to support for total national pooling of the UI 
costs for the much longer unemployment involved in tier 3. 
Federal UI funds would finance all tier 3 benefits.
The three-tier financing arrangement would have two im 
portant effects. One would be to reduce the scope of ex 
perience rating. While limited to short term tier 1 benefits 
and, if the state chooses, half the costs of tier 2, experience 
rating would still apply for most of the UI benefit costs of 
the first 26 weeks of unemployment. Three-tier cost 
estimates, to be discussed below, indicate that tier 1 benefit 
costs plus half the costs of tier 2 would account for about 70 
to 75 percent of all UI costs under the proposed program. 
Tier 1 alone would account for about 60 percent of all costs. 
Thus, experience rating would still play a substantial role.
Depending on how a state redesigns its UI tax structure, 
confining experience rating to tier 1 costs might provide a
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better opportunity to effectively charge all, or nearly all, 
such costs to individual employers. At present, a portion of 
benefit costs charged to some high-cost employers is not 
covered by their taxes because of maximum tax rates. The 
range of existing tax schedules is likely to make experience 
rating more completely effective for short term benefit costs. 
Employers with seasonal operations that generate a great 
deal of short term but little longer term insured unemploy 
ment often are at the maximum rate, but some are ineffec 
tively charged for all costs. To the extent these employers 
have tier 2 and 3 costs which are pooled through a uniform 
tax, the experience-rated taxes they now pay at maximum tax 
rates would cover more, if not all, of their short term UI 
costs.
One other advantage claimed for experience rating, that of 
involving employers in verifying the legitimacy of claims for 
UI entitlement, would be maintained adequately by the 
charging of tier 1 benefits to the separating employer. Since 
the cooperation of employers in checking the legitimacy of 
claims concerns mainly job separation issues, the employers' 
stake in tier 1 benefits would still motivate them to identify 
claims that should be disqualified.
The second effect of the three-tier financing arrangement 
derives from the expanded national pooling of UI 
costs half the benefits of tier 2 and all of tier 3. To a con 
siderable extent, the broader pooling would accomplish the 
objective of reinsurance without having to establish a special 
scheme for the purpose. All the reinsurance or cost equaliza 
tion plans advanced so far face a dilemma. Either they 
discriminate against low-cost states by concentrating the 
reinsurance or cost equalization grants among the high-cost 
states, or they allow all states a chance to qualify for grants 
without regard to the levels of costs or to unemployment 
levels, thereby reducing the grants to high-cost states needed 
to offset their "excess costs." Schemes that attempt to strike
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a balance between these two positions often involve complex 
mechanisms to determine state eligibility for grants and the 
amounts of the grants payable. National pooling of half of 
tier 2 and all of tier 3 costs would relieve all states of some 
cost burden, and would relieve the high-unemployment, 
high-cost states of a larger proportion of their total burden. 
High unemployment levels usually mean longer duration of 
unemployment and, therefore, proportionately more tier 2 
and tier 3 benefits. National pooling of costs in these tiers 
would ease the strains on state UI financing and offer better 
assurance of fund solvency.
Qualifying requirements 
and potential duration
Under their present UI laws, all states require a minimum 
amount of employment and/or earnings in a base period to 
qualify for any benefits. 12 These minimum requirements 
vary a good deal among the states, both in form and level. 
As of January 1981, 13 states rquired from 14 to 20 weeks of 
employment to qualify. Except for Washington, which 
specified a minimum number of hours of work (680) in the 
base period, all other states stated their requirements in 
terms of earnings. For 16 states, total base-period earnings 
had to equal at least a specified multiple of earnings in the 
highest quarter, ranging from 1.25 to 1.6. If the claimant 
had 13 weeks of work in the high quarter, this range of 
multiples was equivalent to a little more than 16 to nearly 21 
weeks of work in the base period, provided the weekly 
amount earned was constant. Another 16 states required 
total earnings equal to at least a specified multiple of the 
weekly benefit amount for which the claimant qualified,
12. State UI provisions as of January 1981 are from Comparison of State Unemployment 
Insurance Laws and Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, 
January 4, 1981, both issued by the U.S. Department of Labor's Employment and Training 
Administration.
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which in turn depended on the level and fraction of high- 
quarter earnings used to calculate the weekly benefit amount 
and on the benefit ceiling. The equivalence of this type of re 
quirement to weeks of employment is less consistent than 
that of the high-quarter multiple. To the extent the 
claimant's employment pattern is that needed to make them 
equivalent, the weekly benefit multiples, ranging generally 
from 30 to 40, would be equivalent to about 15 to 20 weeks 
of work. The remaining states required a minimum flat 
amount of base-period earnings, from $600 to $1,400, usual 
ly with earnings required in at least two quarters. Work time 
equivalents are indeterminate for these requirements, but 
flat-earnings tests make it possible to qualify with con 
siderably less than 14 weeks of work.
These minimum requirements qualify a claimant for a 
given level of potential duration, usually the minimum in the 
states which vary the weeks allowed by the base-period ex 
perience. As of January 1981, 43 states varied the duration 
allowed; in the other states, all eligible claimants qualified 
for a uniform potential duration. Minimum potential dura 
tion in the variable duration states ranged from 4 to 20 
weeks. Because of the variation in the duration formulas 
used by these states, the number of weeks of employment (or 
the equivalent in earnings) needed by claimants to qualify for 
26 weeks of benefits ranged widely. In several states, only 
claimants who worked all 52 weeks in their base periods 
could qualify for 26 weeks; in a few others, only 26 weeks of 
employment were needed. 13 Among the uniform duration 
states, claimants qualified for 26 or 28 weeks of benefits with 
as few as 14 to 20 weeks of work (or the equivalent) in most, 
and with the flat minimum amount of base-period earnings
13. In 1980, Pennsylvania replaced its 30-week uniform duration provision by one pro 
viding up to 26 weeks of benefits to claimants with at least 18 weeks of base-period employ 
ment and up to 30 weeks for those who worked at least 24 weeks.
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required to qualify in a few others. 14 Eight states provided 
more than 26 weeks of regular benefits with duration max- 
imums ranging from 28 to 36 weeks among them; they re 
quired more base-period employment to qualify for the 
longer duration (except for one uniform duration state). 
During EB periods, the potential duration that claimants can 
draw is 50 percent more (up to a 39-week overall maximum) 
without any additional base-period employment required. 
Among the uniform duration states, this means that 
claimants with as little as 14 to 20 weeks of employment 
could qualify for 39 weeks of benefits during EB periods.
The three-tier program would alter this pattern. The quali 
fying requirements (except for tier 1) and the potential dura 
tion allowed in each tier would be the same in all states. Each 
tier would provide a uniform potential duration of 13 weeks, 
but the total number of weeks allowed claimants by the pro 
gram would vary with their past employment. The three 
levels of total potential duration 13, 26, and 39 weeks are 
associated with three levels of qualifying requiremets, which 
may be more or less than present state requirements for these 
levels of potential duration. All three tiers would be available 
at all times, without regard to the level of unemployment.
Since tier 1 would be financed entirely by the states, they 
would set the qualifying requirements for these benefits. The 
requirements for tiers 2 and 3 would be set by federal law; 
these may induce the states to adopt tier 1 requirements that 
would be consistent with them.It may be desirable, however, 
to set a federal standard limiting the range of tier 1 re 
quirements. No state now requires more than about 20 weeks 
of base-period employment (or the equivalent) to qualify for 
minimum benefits.The preferred requirement for tier 1 
would fall between 14 and 20 weeks of base-period employ 
ment, measured directly in weeks. A high-quarter multiple
14. Puerto Rico provides only 20 weeks of uniform duration.
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requirement would be acceptable as an equivalent if it fell in 
the range of 1.1 and 1.5. The weekly benefit amount multiple 
and, especially, the flat earnings requirements would not be 
acceptable as equivalents.
For tier 2, the qualifying requirement would be 26 weeks 
of base-period employment, or annual earnings equal to 
twice high-quarter earnings. Because of federal financial 
participation in tier 2 benefits with funds raised by a uniform 
tax nationwide, it is appropriate to set a uniform require 
ment. The same reasoning applies for tier 3. Most states now 
require more than 26 weeks of work (or the equivalent) for 
potential duration of 26 weeks; the majority require about 39 
or more weeks.
The tier 3 qualifying requirement would be 39 weeks of 
base-period employment (or an acceptable high-quarter- 
multiple earnings equivalent), but with an alternative of 52 
weeks of work in the past 104 weeks (base period and the 
preceding year combined). In a period of recession, a 
39-week requirement may be difficult to meet. A claimant 
who normally works most of the time but who had substan 
tial unemployment during the previous year or lost time due 
to illness should be able to qualify for the third tier if his 
prior work record indicates good regular attachment. The 
alternative allows that opportunity.
One other problem with present qualifying requirements 
concerns the minimum amount of earnings specified per 
week, or per quarter, or per year. For states using a weeks- 
of-work test, a minimum amount of earnings per week is re 
quired (in a few states, a minimum average per week). As of 
early 1981, these ranged from $20 to $67. In most cases, the 
level is changed infrequently, despite rising wage levels which 
in time make it easier to meet the requirement with fewer 
hours of work per week. The minimum weekly earnings re 
quirement should be set as a fraction of the state average
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weekly wage in covered work so that the amount required 
adjusts periodically for wage level changes. The fraction 
should be small, such as one-fifth or one-sixth, so as not to 
screen out low-wage workers, yet high enough to be mean 
ingful. Ohio's average weekly wage in 1978 was $256; its 
weekly wage requirement has been $20 for many years, now 
well under one-twelfth of the average wage; it probably 
should be about $50 in 1981. Most weeks-of-work states are 
below the appropriate level. The high-quarter multiple re 
quirements also tend to specify minimum high-quarter or 
base-period earnings requirements that are not in keeping 
with current average wage levels. These earnings re 
quirements should also be related to the average wage.
There may be some reluctance to require states with very 
easy minimum requirements, such as a flat-earnings test, to 
adopt the stiffer tier 1 test since it would eliminate from 
eligibility marginal, usually low-paid workers who have been 
unable to find adequate and more steady work. The higher 
requirement would also screen out people who want only a 
little part-time work or who limit their employment to very 
short term seasonal activity. Under JSS, if the claimants 
eliminated represent cases of genuine need, are from low- 
income households, and are available for and actively seek 
ing work, they would likely be eligible for unemployment 
assistance.
One other point needs to be made with respect to how a 
claimant's base-period exprience is applied to the qualifying 
requirements. Most states now define the claimant's base 
period as the first four of the last five completed calendar 
quarters prior to the first claim. That leaves a gap of from 
three to six months. (It is even more in a few states.) In most 
states, information about the base-period experience to be 
measured is contained in agency files accumulated for each 
covered worker from quarterly earnings reports filed by
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employers in conjunction with their state UI tax returns. 
These reports are not submitted until about a month or more 
after a quarter ends. More time is needed to post the data. 
This process accounts for the gap. Some states do not main 
tain worker quarterly wage records but instead request wage 
and employment information from former employers when 
a claimant files a first claim. In these states, there is no gap; 
the most recent months and weeks are included in the base 
period. Where a gap exists, as it does in most states, 
claimants may fail to meet the requirements simply because 
the most recent employment is not included in the base 
period. That result is more likely for a recent new entrant or 
reentrant to the labor force. Often, such claimants are advis 
ed to wait and refile after the turn of another quarter. In the 
interest of reducing the effects of such unequal approaches, 
it may be appropriate to require states to take account of the 
most recent employment, if the claimant falls short of the 
requirement, by requesting a report from the recent em- 
ployer(s).
To sum up, the proposed qualifying requirements and the 
potential benefit duration for each tier are as follows:
Potential duration
Minimum requirement: 
Base-period employment
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
13 weeks 13 weeks 13 weeks
14-20 26 weeks 39 weeks (or 52 
weeks weeks in 2-year 
base period)
or
High-quarter earnings 
multiple equivalent 1.1-1.5 2.0 3.0 (or 4.0 in
2-year base period)
The NCUC has recommended that state minimum qualify 
ing requirements should not be less than 14 weeks of base- 
period employment. It recommends the weeks-of-work form
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of the test or the high-quarter multiple equivalent. The Com 
mission did not recommend a ceiling for the minimum re 
quirement but did urge states to lower their requirements for 
26 weeks of potential duration substantially below 39 weeks 
of work; it recommended that no state be allowed to require 
more than 39 weeks for 26 weeks of benefits. As noted 
earlier, the NCUC favored triggered extended benefit dura 
tion during periods of high unemployment for exhaustees of 
regular benefits.
The proposed three-tier program would operate so that the 
movement from one tier to the next would be a distinct, for 
mal process that makes clear to the claimant, and also 
stresses to the administrative staff, that unemployment has 
reached a new and more serious stage requiring different at 
titudes toward the search for work and, perhaps, different 
approaches. Although the tier qualifying threshold points 
may be arbitrary, they nevertheless serve the purpose of 
signaling a fresh view of the claimant's problem and help to 
create a different psychological atmosphere conducive to 
speedier reemployment.
Continuing eligibility and disqualifications
Besides meeting minimum qualifying requirements, 
claimants now must satisfy other conditions to be eligible, 
and to remain eligible, for benefits. These conditions would 
continue to apply under the three-tier program. What would 
change, however, is the kind of benefit disqualifications im 
posed for failure to meet those conditions.
Under present UI laws, state disqualification provisions 
vary considerably. They have become generally more severe 
in recent years. Leaving a job voluntarily without good cause 
or being discharged for misconduct have always warranted a 
suspension of benefits. The same is true for refusing an offer 
of a suitable job without good cause. In the past, most states
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suspended benefits for a limited period of time after which 
the claimant could draw benefits if still unemployed and 
otherwise eligible. The theory was that unemployment con 
tinuing beyond the suspension period is caused by labor 
market conditions and is no longer the result of the 
claimant's own act. By now, however, the majority of states 
have adopted provisions calling for benefit suspensions 
lasting throughout the claimant's current unemployment; 
benefits become payable only after the claimant has worked 
again for at least a specified amount of time (or earned at 
least a specified amount) and is then laid off under qualify 
ing circumstances. Other states still suspend benefits for a 
limited period, most from 4 to 13 weeks. In addition to 
benefit suspension, some states also reduce a disqualified 
claimant's potential duration entitlement.
Under the three-tier program, no state would suspend 
benefits for more than 13 weeks for a voluntary quit or 
misconduct discharge disqualification. For refusal of a 
suitable job, the suspension would not exceed 6 weeks while 
the claimant is in tier 1; it could be as long as 13 weeks after 
tier 1, allowing states the opportunity to increase pressure on 
the claimant to accept a broader range of job offers or refer 
rals. In no case would benefit rights be reduced or canceled.
One reason for the recently increased severity of state dis 
qualification provisions is that many employers strongly ob 
ject to the payment of post-suspension benefits to a former 
employee who left the job or was fired for misconduct, 
especially when those benefits can contribute to an increase 
in the employer's tax rate. That is seen as "adding insult to 
injury." Some states have eased this issue by not charging 
these benefits to the individual employer's account and by 
pooling the costs among all employers instead. A suspension 
lasting as long as two or three months appears harsh enough 
for the disqualified claimant. The more aggressive pursuit of 
new employment under the proposed Job Security System
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and the closer review of the claimant's job search activity can 
help prevent malingering, which is commonly attributed to 
disqualified claimants and is another reason advanced for 
severe treatment.
The guideline long urged by the federal government for 
setting the length of the benefit suspension for job separa 
tion disqualifications has been the average duration of a spell 
of unemployment. Presumably, the average claimant should 
find a new job in that time; unemployment beyond that 
point is considered the result of poor employment conditions 
and not the claimant's fault. That unemployment, it is 
argued, has become involuntary, and the claimant should be 
entitled to draw benefits. Historically, the average spell 
duration has ranged generally from about five to eight 
weeks, depending on economic conditions. The average, 
however, may be badly understated by the inclusion of 
unemployment spells of workers on short term layoffs who 
do not seek other jobs. The average for permanently 
separated workers is probably higher and therefore may be a 
more appropriate guide for the suspension period for dis 
qualified workers. Allowing suspensions lasting up to 13 
weeks seems consistent with this line of reasoning. The more 
moderate suspension period for a job refusal in tier 1 reflects 
the less certain circumstances that surround this disqualifica 
tion. The related issues of what is a "suitable" job and what 
constitutes good cause for refusal leave enough room for 
uncertainty about the accuracy of the decision as to warrant 
giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt in this way, 
especially in the early stages of unemployment.
A claimant who becomes unable to work or is not 
available for work is disqualified from benefits during the 
period involved. The same rule would apply under the three- 
tier program. One present exception that would continue to 
apply is that a claimant who undertakes approved training 
remains eligible to draw benefits even though not available
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to take a job while training. Failure, without good cause, to 
seek work in ways appropriate to the claimant's occupation 
and labor market, or in keeping with a job search plan 
developed with JSS staff, also would result in a disqualifica 
tion.
Some state laws spell out conditions of availability for 
work, active search for work, and the suitability of work in 
specific terms. In most cases, the statutory conditions are ex 
pressed in general terms, or allow for circumstances under 
which the conditions may be applied differently. For exam 
ple, registration for work at a local employment office 
generally is required, but there are exceptions. Besides 
registration, the law usually calls for an active or reasonable 
search for work by the claimant, but how active and in what 
manner are frequently left to the discretion of the ad 
ministrative staff. Most state laws specify the criteria for 
"suitability" of the work the claimant should seek or accept, 
and there has been some tendency in recent years for these 
provisions to become more specific and less flexible. Most 
notably, several states have spelled out in their laws precise 
reductions in wage levels, relative to the claimant's former 
wage or weekly benefit amount, that the claimant would be 
required to accept as suitable as unemployment reaches 
specific duration points. Rigid application of these condi 
tions can produce arbitrary, illogical, and unfair results in 
some cases. In the JSS context of periodic individualized 
review and counseling, well-trained staff should be capable 
of exercising reasonable judgment about "availability" and 
"suitability" so as to minimize malingering without the need 
for restrictively narrow statutory definitions of these terms.
The National Commission recommended less severity and 
less rigidity in state eligibility and disqualification provi 
sions. It urged a limited period of benefit suspension for dis 
qualified claimants set within a range prescribed by law and 
based on individual circumstances. It recommended against
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suspensions lasting until the claimant requalified with new 
employment and against reduction of a disqualified clai 
mant's benefit rights, except in cases of fraud. With regard 
to provisions requiring availability and search for work and 
defining suitability of work, the Commission favored more 
general terms and their application on a case-by-case basis, 
taking account of relevant individual circumstances, labor 
market conditions, and hiring practices. The claimant's job 
search should be reasonable and appropriate in the light of 
these circumstances and judged accordingly.
The weekly benefit amount
States presently determine their own weekly benefit 
amount (WBA) formulas, and the variation is very wide. Ex 
cept for four states which, as of January 1981, calculated the 
WBA as a fraction of the claimant's total base-period earn 
ings, all formulas are designed to compensate a claimant for 
a fraction of the former weekly wage, usually half or more, 
up to a benefit maximum. The long-established objective for 
the WBA provision is that the great majority of claimants, or 
of potential claimants, should be able to receive at least half 
their weekly wage when unemployed. 15 Most states base the 
measure of the weekly wage loss on earnings in the high 
quarter and calculate the WBA as a fraction (usually one- 
twenty-sixth or more) of those earnings. Others average the 
weekly wage directly over the actual weeks of employment in 
the base period and set the WBA as a fraction, ranging from 
one-half to two-thirds, of that average wage. Only two states 
used high-quarter formulas in 1981 which resulted in WBAs 
of less than half the weekly wage (less than one-twenty-sixth 
high-quarter earnings) at levels below the maximum.
The major barrier to the achievement of the WBA objec 
tive has been the benefit ceilings in state laws. These have
15. This objective was first stated by President Eisenhower in the mid-1950s in an 
Economic Report and has been reiterated many times since by succeeding Administrations.
The Three-Tier Program 89
generally been too low in many states, relative to general 
wage levels, so that large proportions of claimants are unable 
to receive half or more of their weekly wage as intended by 
the basic formulas. In 1979, nationally, about 40 percent of 
all claimants were at the maximum WBA, meaning that most 
of them received less than half their wage. In 10 states, over 
half the claimants were at the ceiling. 16 In the four states 
which calculate the WBA as a fraction of annual earnings, 
claimants can and do receive less than half their weekly wage 
at all benefit levels, not only at the maximum.
Under the three-tier program, because federal UI tax 
revenues would be heavily involved in financing benefits, a 
greater degree of uniformity among state benefit provisions 
would be desirable. Also desirable would be some reduction 
of the inequities of the different rates of weekly compensa 
tion paid by states to unemployed workers who have earned 
the same wage. For these reasons, two federal benefit stan 
dards would apply. One would require all state formulas to 
assure that, at levels below the ceiling, no claimant receives a 
WBA of less tfran half the claimant's weekly wage (or less 
than the equivalent high-quarter fraction of one-twenty- 
sixth); annual wage formulas would not be acceptable. The 
other standard would require the states to set their ceilings as 
a fraction of at least two-thirds of the state average weekly 
covered wage. Only 13 states set their ceilings this high as of 
early 1981; ceilings in about a third of the states, including 
several of the largest states, were less than 50 percent of their 
average wage levels.
For many states, the required increase in the ceiling would 
be a drastic and very costly change to make all at once. The 
National Commission recommended the same standards but 
with a series of steps over a period of years to reach the ceil-
16. Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1979, p. 52.
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ing of two-thirds of the average wage. That approach is a 
sensible one.
One other problem concerns states, such as Alaska and 
Michigan, with average wage levels well above the national 
average. A maximum WBA of two-thirds the state average 
wage would mean a ceiling estimated at close to $300 in 
Alaska and about $210 in Michigan for 1981, compared with 
their actual 1981 ceilings of $150 and $182, respectively (ex 
cluding allowances for dependents). The ceilings that the 
standard would require in these states seem very high in com 
parison with what many workers earn in much of the coun 
try, even those at the average wage levels in their states. 
These ceilings also would be quite costly. 17 A modified ver 
sion of the proposed standard would help moderate the 
problem and could be regarded as consistent with the financ 
ing arrangements for the three-tier program. Since the 
federal share of benefit costs in tiers 2 and 3 would be paid 
from funds raised from a uniform federal tax that applies to 
a uniform taxable wage base, some limit on the application 
of the two-third standard to the state average wage for the 
benefit ceiling may be justified. The National Commission 
has recommended that the taxable wage base for the federal 
tax eventually (by 1989) equal 65 percent of the national 
average annual wage in covered employment. States with 
average weekly wages above the national average could 
choose to set the required benefit ceiling at the two-third 
standard or as a percentage of the national average weekly
17. Alaska has the added problem of the effects of extreme seasonal patterns on earnings. 
Since a large proportion of workers in that state are unable to work year-round because of 
very long and cold winters, their weekly earnings tend to be much higher when they do 
work than would normally be the case. Many workers command higher wage rates because 
of these conditions and many work a great deal of overtime. The state average weekly wage 
level, computed on the basis of an average level of employment throughout the year, 
therefore seriously overstates what the average normally would be, given a more usual 
employment pattern. Alaska calculates the WBA as a fraction of annual rather than weekly 
or high-quarter earnings.
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wage equal to the percentage used to determine the ap 
plicable federal taxable wage base. Assuming that the na 
tional average weekly wage for 1980 was about $275, and 
that a taxable wage base equal to 65 percent of the 1980 na 
tional average annual wage was in force for 1981, then no 
state ceiling would need to be higher than $179 in that year. 
As of early 1981, eight states had ceilings above $179, most 
of them only when dependents are taken into account.
Not much attention has been given to the minimum WBA 
payable. State UI weekly minimums in January 1981 ranged 
from $5 to $43. They were under $20 in almost half the 
states. In most states, minimum WBAs have gone up very lit 
tle or not at all over recent years despite steadily rising wage 
levels. Relatively few UI recipients draw the minimum or 
near minimum weekly amounts and little is known about 
them. Many probably are claimants who had worked part 
time. Even at the $3.35 federal minimum wage level ap 
plicable in 1981, a worker employed for only 20 hours a week 
can earn $67 and qualify for a $34 benefit at the 50 percent 
replacement rate. Only 10 states had a minimum this high as 
1981 began. Minimum WBAs are clearly behind the times. 
While not a very important factor as far as UI is concerned, 
the UI minimum takes on more significance for weekly 
unemployment assistance amounts, as explained in chapter 
VI.
One approach that seems reasonable is to relate the UI 
minimum WBA to the minimum amount of weekly earnings 
specified in the qualifying requirement. The suggestion made 
above with respect to the qualifying requirement is to set the 
minimum weekly earnings required as a fraction (one-fifth 
or one-sixth) of the statewide average weekly covered wage. 
Based on estimated 1980 state average weekly wages, a 
minimum weekly earnings requirement of one-fifth and a 50 
percent replacement rate, minimum WBAs in 1981 probably
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would exceed $20 in all states (perhaps only Puerto Rico 
would be lower).
Dependents' allowances also affect the WBA. Thirteen 
states currently take account of dependents in their for 
mulas. The standards discussed above apply to benefits 
before dependents are considered. Under the three-tier pro 
gram, states would continue to be free to add dependents' 
allowances if they wish, but the proportion of the claimant's 
weekly wage compensated by the WBA, including 
allowances, would not exceed 75 percent in any case. A 
higher proportion, as can occur now in a few states for a 
claimant with many dependents, may come too close to the 
claimant's take-home wage level and seriously weaken the 
work-incentive effect of the benefit-wage differential.
Partial or reduced weekly benefits
All states have partial benefit formulas so that a claimant 
can draw a reduced WBA if the normal work schedule is 
reduced appreciably, or if the claimant takes temporary part- 
time work while waiting to return to a regular job or while 
looking for a full-time job. Most partial benefit formulas, 
however, given little encouragement to such part-time 
employment even when it is available and desirable as a tem 
porary measure. Nor do they encourage work sharing, 
whereby an employer keeps all workers employed but on a 
temporarily reduced schedule rather than lay off completely 
part of the workforce. Under most formulas, the amount 
earned (or most of it) is offset against the WBA so that even 
moderate earnings tend to wipe out all benefits leaving little 
or no incentive to take such employment or to share work. 
For example, a fairly typical provision (used by about half 
the states) holds that a claimant earning as much as or more 
than the WBA can receive no benefit at all; if less is earned, 
the full WBA is reduced by the amount earned less a modest 
portion (a "disregard") ranging usually from $2 to $15 or
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from 20 to 40 percent of the WBA. In most other states, the 
provision is very similar except that a partial benefit is 
payable if the claimant's earnings come to less than the WBA 
plus the amount of the disregard.
Recent interest in work sharing has focused greater atten 
tion on the limitations of present partial UI benefit for 
mulas. Work sharing is used extensively and successfully in 
other industrial nations with UI provisions that accom 
modate that approach. California has been experimenting 
with UI provisions which make work sharing feasible and 
worthwhile. 18 A temporarily reduced workweek may be a 
better response than total layoffs to a brief business slump. 
Continued work experience and fringe benefits are impor 
tant considerations. If a full layoff eventually is necessary, a 
reduced workweek for a period before that event may help 
the worker find new employment while still employed. Job 
search prospects are almost always better for an employed 
worker than an unemployed one. Partial benefit provisions 
should help support work sharing under controlled condi 
tions.
Where partial benefits are payable in the case of a reduced 
work schedule, the work reduction should be a general one 
applicable to all workers in a plant or establishment, or to a 
well-defined class of such workers. The reduction should be 
temporary. Other conditions may have to apply to assure 
that a bona fide reduction has occurred. If the reduction 
continues beyond a certain period of time, and other suitable 
full-time job opportunities are available, affected workers 
should be referred to such jobs.
A partial benefit formula designed to encourage a claim 
ant to accept temporary part-time work or a reduced work 
schedule in place of a total layoff should allow the worker to
18. Fred Best, Work Sharing: Issues, Policy Options and Prospects (Kalamazoo, MI: The 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981).
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increase his total income (reduced earnings plus the partial 
benefit) above what it would be if he were totally 
unemployed and drawing his full WBA. The formula should 
not, however, result in total income equal to what the claim 
ant earned when fully employed.
Under the three-tier program, state partial benefit for 
mulas would provide a partial WBA to claimants who take 
temporary part-time jobs or have a temporary work- 
schedule reduction as part of a general work sharing plan. 
Separate formulas would apply for each type of reduced 
earnings. In the case of a temporary part-time job, a partial 
WBA would be payable if the claimant earns no more than 
75 percent of his usual full-time wage or one-and-one-half 
times his WBA, whichever is less. The full WBA would be 
reduced by a fraction of not more than two-thirds of the 
claimant's current earnings. In the case of work sharing, a 
partial benefit would be payable when the reduced schedule 
is not more than 80 percent of the normal workweek, such as 
a reduction from five to four days. The partial WBA payable 
would be the proportion of the full WBA that the hours of 
work lost represented of the normal workweek. A week of 
partial benefits would count as a part-week against the 
claimant's total benefit entitlement. Thus, a partial benefit 
equal to half the full WBA would count as a half-week 
against the claimant's total entitlement.
Claimants who take temporary part-time work could 
receive a partial benefit at any time during any of the three 
tiers. Partial benefits payable under work sharing plans 
would be payable only in tiers 1 and 2 and for only the 
equivalent of 13 full weeks of benefits.
The National Commission recommended that states 
change their partial benefit formulas so that claimants would 
be encouraged to take part-time jobs. It suggested that the 
WBA be reduced by a percentage rather than all of the earn-
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ings made. The Commission took no position with regard to 
work sharing plans and their relationship to partial benefit 
provisions. It did urge continued research and evaluation of 
the various proposals and the issues involved.
One other type of partial benefit is introduced under the 
three-tier program, although on an experimental basis in a 
few states at first. It would be payable only in tier 3 to a 
claimant who accepts new full-time employment at wages 
well below wages earned in previous employment. The par 
tial benefit would constitute a temporary wage supplement 
to induce a claimant who had been unemployed for 26 or 
more weeks to take a lower-paying job. The partial WBA 
would be calculated in the same way as for that payable to a 
claimant taking a temporary part-time job.
Cost Estimates for the Three-Tier Program
Estimates have been prepared of the size and costs of the 
three-tier program compared with existing UI programs. 
They are based on a model constructed from information 
obtained on the 1976 National Survey of Income and Educa 
tion and from other studies of labor force experience. The 
model can be applied to estimate benefit costs generated by 
alternative state UI provisions for given years at specified 
rates of unemployment. 19 Through this model, U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor staff has developed estimates for the three- 
tier program and existing programs under specified assump 
tions. The estimates must be regarded as tentative since there 
may be some question about the model's capacity to deter 
mine accurately for each state the eligibility of unemployed 
workers for the three tiers based on the employment and 
earnings information it contains. National estimates are
19. The model was prepared by The Urban Institute for the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation and the U.S. Department of Labor for use in estimating the 
costs and effects of Commission recommendations and of other possible changes in UI.
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probably more reliable than the individual state estimates; 
the national figures are totals of the state figures. 20
With these reservations in mind, the national estimates 
that were prepared for the three-tier program and the ex 
isting UI programs are presented in table 3. The following 
conditions and assumptions apply for the estimates:
1. The state provisions used for existing UI programs 
are as of January 1980.
2. January 1980 state WBA provisions apply for the 
three-tier estimates rather than the WBA provisions 
proposed above.
3. The qualifying requirements applied for each state for 
tier 1 eligibility are 14 weeks of base-period employ 
ment and total base-period earnings equal to 14 times 
20 percent of the statewide average weekly covered 
wage estimated for 1979.
4. The qualifying requirement applied for tier 3 is 26 
weeks of work in the base period, the same as for tier 
2, rather than 39 weeks. The proposed alternative for 
tier 3 of 52 weeks in the base period and preceding 
year for those with less than 39 weeks of base-period 
work was not applied since the longer record is not 
available. The result is some overstatement of the 
number of tier 3 claimants and benefit costs. 
(Estimates of tier 3 costs when applying a 39-weeks 
requirement are about 7 to 10 percent less than those 
eligible with a 26-weeks test; the alternative require 
ment would reduce the differences.)
5. Three-tier estimates do not reflect proposed dis 
qualification provisions.
20. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are not included in these estimates.
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Table 3
National Estimates of Benefit Costs and Claimants Under Existing
UI Programs and the Proposed Three-Tier Program, 1980
Unemployment rate assumed
Item
Persons with unemployment
Persons eligible 
Regular UI benefits 
Tier 1 benefits
First payments 
Regular UI program 
Extended benefits
First payments 
Tier 1 benefits 
Tier 2 benefits 
Tier 3 benefits
Exhaustions 
Regular UI program 
Extended benefits
Exhaustions 
Tier 1 benefits 
Tier 2 benefits 
Tier 3 benefits
Benefits paid 
Regular UI program 
Extended benefits
Total
Benefits paid 
Tier 1 benefits 
Tier 2 benefits 
Tier 3 benefits
Total
5.5 percent 6.6 percent 7.5 percent 8.5 percent
(dollar estimates in millions; others in thousands)
19,260
8,152 
7,962
6,625 
33
6,395 
2,489 
1,117
1,220 
20
2,620 
1,117 
536
$9,186 
29
$9,215
$6,350 
2,631 
1,196
$10,177
20,943
9,086
8,877
7,629 
210
7,354 
3,066 
1,492
1,643 
127
3,253 
1,492 
765
$11,256 
171
$11,427
$7,580 
3,387 
1,671
$12,638
22,384
9,913 
9,690
8,548 
1,050
8,268 
3,700 
1,875
2,062 
652
3,901 
1,875 
1,009
$13,139 
1,047
$14,186
$8,668 
4,140 
2,130
$14,938
24,002
10,780 
10,542
9,318 
2,412
9,018 
4,179 
2,194
2,414 
1,450
4,418 
2,194 
1,137
$14,771 
2,415
$17,186
$9,658 
4,734 
2,497
$16,889
SOURCE: Estimates provided by staff of Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy 
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Department of Labor.
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6. The estimates are for the year 1980 with the average 
(total) unemployment rate assumed at four different 
levels:
a. 5.5 percent 
b. 6.6 percent 
c. 7.5 percent 
d. 8.5 percent
7. Estimates of extended benefits as provided under ex 
isting programs are based on the estimated triggering 
of EB on and off, by state and nationally, throughout 
the year. EB is estimated payable under each assumed 
unemployment rate on a calendar quarter rather than 
weekly basis. The national EB program is estimated 
to trigger on only under the assumed 8.5 percent rate, 
and remains on throughout the year. Under each of 
the other assumed rates, the number of states trig 
gered on, by number of quarters, are as follows:
Unemployment Total One Two Three Four 
rate on quarter quarters quarters quarters
5.5 32010
6.6 11 8 1 0 2
7.5 27 9 11 2 5
The estimates in table 3 show that total benefits paid out 
by the three-tier program would exceed total outlays of the 
existing regular and EB programs under three of the assumed 
unemployment rates, and would be less only under the 8.5 
percent rate. Total outlays compare as follows:
Assumed unemployment rates
5.5
$ 9.2 
10.2
6.6 7.5
(billions)
$11.4 $14.2 
12.6 14.9
8.5
$17.2 
16.9
Existing programs 
Three-tier program
Most of the difference arises from EB outlays compared with 
tier 3 outlays. The latter exceed total EB payments at all
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assumed unemployment levels, although by only $82 million 
at the 8.5 percent rate. At lower assumed unemployment 
levels, the difference is over $1 billion in each case. It is in 
teresting to note that regular UI program outlays total about 
$200 million to $300 million more than tier 1 and tier 2 
benefits combined at each unemployment level. The effect, 
then, of the three-tier approach is some shifting of benefits 
to better attached and longer term unemployed workers.
The pattern indicated by these cost estimates seems clear. 
At lower levels of unemployment, the three-tier program 
would pay out more in benefits than the present system. As 
unemployment rises, and extended benefits become increas 
ingly widespread, the difference narrows. At some point, 
outlays under the present UI system would exceed three-tier 
outlays.
Another observation worth noting here is that tier 1 ac 
counts for well over half the estimated total benefit costs of 
the three-tier program. The range is from 57 to 62 
percent the lower the rate of unemployment, the higher the 
proportion. Tier 3 accounts for 12 to 15 percent of total 
costs, rising with increased unemployment. Considering tiers 
1 and 2 only, as some approximation of the regular UI pro 
gram, tier 1 costs range from 67 to 71 percent of the two 
tiers, indicating how much UI costs concentrate in the first 
13 weeks of unemployment.
Somewhat fewer unemployed workers would qualify for 
tier 1 benefits than for regular benefits under January 1980 
provisions. For states with flat annual earnings re 
quirements, such as California, the 14-weeks test for tier 1 
would be more restrictive. In some other states, the 14-weeks 
requirement would qualify more than would the current test, 
such as 20 weeks in New York. The base-period total earn 
ings test applied for tier 1, however, may be stiffer than earn 
ings required by the existing provision, thereby offsetting
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some of this difference. On balance, the tier 1 test appears to 
be more demanding overall. Under the proposed three-tier 
programs described above, states would be free to set the tier 
1 requirement anywhere from 14 to 20 weeks. To the extent 
they are set closer to 20 weeks, fewer claimants would 
qualify for tier 1.
Under the regular UI program, the exhaustion rate rises 
with the level of unemployment. Based on table 3 estimates, 
these rates follow the expected pattern ranging from about 
18 percent under the 5.5 percent unemployment rate to 26 
percent under the 8.5 percent rate (table 4). 21 Comparable 
exhaustion rates under the three-tier system are not quite as 
clear-cut. Appropriate comparisons are with exhaustees of 
tier 2 plus tier 1 exhaustees who did not draw any tier 2 
payments, presumably because they could not qualify, 
although a few may have returned to work at that point. Ad 
ding the two together, the exhaustees of the first two tiers 
represent exhaustion rates running about one percentage 
point more than the rates under the regular program, at all 
four assumed unemployment levels. Tier 1 exhaustees who 
did not go on to tier 2 were only about 10 percent of the total 
exhausting tiers 1 or 2, but enough to account for the higher 
rate as compared with the regular program. These claimants 
draw for 13 weeks but do not meet the 26-weeks work test of 
tier 2; many would draw additional weeks under the regular 
program in some states and return to work before ex 
hausting. On the other hand, many regular benefit ex 
haustees who draw more than 13 but less than 26 weeks of 
benefits would qualify for tier 2 and be eligible for 26 weeks
21. Exhaustion rates as used in this analysis are lower than what they would be if they could 
be calculated the usual way whereby the total of exhaustees for a 12-month period is taken 
as a percent of first payments totaled for a 12-month period ending 6 months earlier. With 
the lag in the periods of the two totals not possible with the data developed for the 
estimates first payments would be lower for the lagged period than for the period of the 
exhaustee count (much lower as unemployment rises) and the exhaustion rates therefore 
would be higher.
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Table 4
Comparison of Estimated Exhaustion Rates Under Regular, EB, and
Three-Tier UI Programs, 1980_______________________
Exhaustion rates 1
Assumed unemployment rates of: 
Program 5.5 percent 6.6 percent 7.5 percent 8.5 percent
Regular program 
Tiers 1 and 2 2
EB program 
Tier 3
Regular and EB programs 
Three-tier program
18.4% 
19.5
60.6 
48.0
18.2 
10.4
21.5% 
23.0
60.5 
51.3
20.4 
12.9
24.1% 
25.1
62.2 
53.8
19.5 
14.6
25.6% 
27.0
60.1 
51.8
15.6 
15.3
SOURCE: Table 3 data.
1. Estimated number of exhaustions in 1980 as a percent of first payments in 1980; these 
rates understate the more accurate rates based on first payments in year ending 6 months 
earlier.
2. Includes tier 1 exhaustees who did not draw tier 2 benefits.
of benefits in all. Some might, therefore, be carried long 
enough so that they return to work before exhausting tier 2. 
These offsetting effects seem to balance out in a way leading 
to a higher exhaustion rate under tiers 1 and 2 than under the 
regular program. The rates under the two programs are 
close, however, possibly within the range of estimating er 
rors.
The tier 3 exhaustion rate ranges between 48 and 54 per 
cent of those receiving tier 3 payments. 22 The EB exhaustion 
rate runs about 60-62 percent at all assumed unemployment 
levels. The uniform 13-week addition of tier 3 appears to 
cover the need for longer protection more adequately than 
does the largely variable EB addition.
22. With the 26 weeks-of-work test applied for tier 3, the assumption is that all tier 2 ex 
haustees go on to draw tier 3. Some actually would not because the tier 3 test (39 weeks of 
work or the alternative) would screen them out, but probably not enough to make any im 
portant difference in these comparisons.
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These estimates, then, indicate that, compared with 
regular benefits, the three-tier program would qualify 
somewhat fewer claimants for benefits, but a slightly higher 
proportion of claimants paid may exhaust their entitlement 
under tiers 1 and 2 than do regular UI claimants. Adding tier 
3, however, reduces the total program exhaustion rate con 
siderably, ranging from 10 to 15 percent, depending on the 
level of unemployment. Adding EB to the regular program 
in the periods payable results in final regular-EB exhaustion 
rates that run a good deal higher than the three-tier exhaus 
tion rates until unemployment is high enough to trigger on 
EB nationally year-round. At that point, the two exhaustion 
rates are about the same.
VI. UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
The proposed Job Security System includes a new 
unemployment assistance program as a major backstop to 
UI. UA would be available to unemployed workers from 
low-income households who do not receive UI. These in 
clude jobless workers who are not covered by UI, do not 
meet the UI qualifying requirements, or who have exhausted 
UI. UA would be a federal program financed by general 
revenues but administered by state job security agencies.
As proposed, the new program would replace the 
federally-subsidized state AFDC programs and state or local 
general assistance insofar as these programs now provide 
support to unemployed workers. Eligible UA claimants 
would report their employment and job search status on a 
weekly basis and receive payments for weeks of unemploy 
ment. They would be subject to treatment and monitoring 
similar to UI claimants with regard to job search assistance, 
counseling, and continuing eligibility.
Justification for UA
Several considerations enter into the rationale for a new 
federal UA program. One is the desirability of treating 
unemployed workers who need income support primarily as 
jobseekers rather than as welfare cases. For the past 20 
years, welfare program amendments and reform proposals 
have laid increasing stress, through incentives and re-
103
104 Unemployment Assistance
quirements, on moving adult recipients into labor force ac 
tivity aimed at making them more or entirely self- 
supporting. With certain exceptions, adult recipients of 
AFDC must register at the employment service and be 
available for placement in jobs, training programs, or sub 
sidized public employment. The WIN program is designed 
specifically to help move these individuals into such activity.' 
Still, their cash support continues to come from the same 
program supporting persons who are not required to be 
available for work or training, such as mothers of children 
under school age and those caring for sick or disabled family 
members. This mixture of cases that emphasize work orien 
tation with cases that do not tends to blur the emphasis. Re 
cent welfare reform proposals continue to lump together the 
work- and nonwork-oriented with respect to cash assistance. 
A UA program for the former would carry to a more logical 
footing the policy of moving capable welfare recipients from 
welfare to work.
Under the proposed UA program, recipients would claim 
their cash assistance on a weekly basis. The basis of the claim 
and the payment would relate to employment rather than 
welfare circumstances. With some frequency, recipients 
would receive close counseling concerning employment 
possibilities, job search, training, and other types of ad 
justments or actions to improve their vocational capabilities. 
They would thereby be encouraged to see themselves chiefly 
as jobseekers and not mainly as welfare cases, and to apply 
themselves accordingly. The same view of them by ad 
ministrative staff would also contribute to the emphasis on 
work orientation.
As proposed, UA would also embrace low-income 
unemployed workers who are not supported by present
1. The WIN (Work Incentive) program has operated since 1968; for a recent account of 
that program's operations, see Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980, 
pp. 50-54.
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welfare programs. AFDC is confined to households with 
dependent children and, in about half the states, to single- 
parent households. State and local general assistance is 
unevenly available or very restrictive. Various welfare 
reform proposals have aimed at including in AFDC all two- 
parent families and unemployed persons without children 
(childless couples and, less often, single individuals), but 
with no success to date.
UA, financed fully from federal funds, would relieve the 
states of some of the current financial burdens of welfare, 
another aim of reform proposals. These burdens fall uneven 
ly on the states and reflect uneven levels of support and treat 
ment.
Another consideration in support of UA is the need to 
place limits on the employer-financed UI program. The 
reasoning for a 39-week limitation for UI was discussed 
earlier. Besides the duration limit, the application of increas 
ingly stiff qualifying requirements, tier by tier, while 
desirable for insurance benefits based on rights earned 
through employment, would screen out some marginal 
workers. UA would apply less stringent work qualifying re 
quirements, and would give credit for the time spent in voca 
tional training and education or for other evidence of labor 
force activity. The sentiment for maintaining low UI qualify 
ing requirements or for extending UI benefit duration for ex 
tremely long periods is understandable when no adequate, 
alternative income support exists for workers with limited 
past employment or very long term unemployment problems 
who need support. Stretching UI to cover these needs 
weakens that program's insurance character and is more 
costly than confining such support to low-income cases.
Eligibility Requirements
To qualify for UA, unemployed workers would have to 
meet a household income test and tests of past and current
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labor force attachment. The present AFDC program does 
not apply a prior work requirement, except for unemployed 
fathers where states have adopted this added segment of 
AFDC. To be eligible for AFDC, the unemployed father in 
the household must have qualified for UI during the past 
year, or worked in at least 6 of the last 13 calendar quarters. 
AFDC means tests place limitations on household income 
and assets. 2 No prior work test applies for general assistance; 
a means test is the principal eligibility rule.
Income Test for UA
The measurement of "need" proposed for UA eligibility is 
less limiting than present welfare tests. Only income would 
be a factor; assets would not be considered. Moreover, UA is 
not intended to be limited to unemployed workers whose 
families have been reduced to poverty; the income test's ob 
jective aims instead at excluding those from households 
where income continues at a reasonable level despite the 
claimant's unemployment. By and large, eligible UA 
claimants would be from families with no other working 
members, or with working members who contribute relative 
ly little to the financial support of their households. This 
concept for the income test would distinguish UA from the 
usual welfare identification with poverty; UA would occupy 
a middle position between welfare and UI.
The approach recommended for the income test links to 
the lower living standard budget developed and estimated 
annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 3 A similar
2. While AFDC has no income test as such, income received is offset against the amount of 
the AFDC payment; the offset for wage income is restricted to two-thirds of the amount 
earned less a disregard of $30; other income is offset fully.
3. BLS has developed three levels of an annual urban family budget representing a 
"lower," "intermediate," and "higher" standard of living for a four-person family of a 
particular composition (a working man, his nonworking wife, and two school-age 
children). Each autumn, BLS prices or updates the costs of these budgets and publishes 
results some months later for selected metropolitan areas and the U.S. See BLS Bulletin 
No. 1570-05, "Three Standards of Living for an Urban Family of Four Persons" (Spring 
1967), U.S. Department of Labor.
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approach is taken as the basis of income eligibility for CETA 
services. The lower level budget represents a "below- 
normal" standard to which a family may be reduced because 
of a temporary loss of income. It is not a "minimal" or 
poverty-level standard.
For example, the U.S. lower level budget estimate for an 
urban, four-person family as of autumn 1979 was $12,585. 4 
The total included $10,234 for consumption expenditures 
and $2,351 for income taxes, social security contributions, 
and other nonconsumption items. The 1979 poverty 
threshold for a nonfarm family of four persons was $7,412. 5 
These estimates can be adjusted for different family sizes. 
Claimants filing for UA following the date when budget data 
become available would have to meet a household income 
test based on this lower level budget estimate. The test ap 
plied could require that the household income during the 
prior 12 months (or during the past 6 or 3 months and an- 
nualized) not exceed the appropriate total budget level or, if 
a more stringent test is desired, the total of consumption 
costs within that budget. The household income test should 
be applied periodically (after 3 or 6 months) to take account 
of changes in income or family size.
Some geographic or urban-rural variation may be 
desirable for the household income test. Since the UA weekly 
amount payable is wage-related, either directly or through a 
relationship to a UI weekly amount (see below) based on 
state provisions, state income tests that reflect cost-of-living
4. "Autumn 1979 Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban 
Areas," News, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC, 
April 30, 1980.
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 125, Money 
Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1979 (Advance 
Report), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1980.
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variations among states may be appropriate. There are 
various possibilities for "fine-tuning" an income test. 6
Prior work requirements
The UA claimant must also give evidence of recent labor 
force attachment. The objective is to make UA broader in 
scope than UI so that it would admit workers who are not 
covered by UI or not able to meet the UI qualifying re 
quirements. The following requirements are proposed for 
UA to allow a wider gate, yet also to keep some reasonable 
basis for assuring attachment. The suggestions are tentative, 
since there is little experience with their adequacy for the 
purpose.
To qualify, the claimant must meet one of the following 
tests:
1. Drew UI during the last year.
2. Worked at least 14 weeks during the last year, with 
earnings each week equal to at least 15 percent of the 
statewide average weekly covered wage. 7
3. Worked at least 10 weeks during the last year with the 
same minimum weekly earnings as above, and 
registered at least 8 weeks at the employment service 
(ES). As an alternative, required ES registration can 
be equal to 2 weeks for each week the claimant is 
short of the 14-weeks employment requirement.
4. Attended at least 26 weeks during the last year at a 
senior high school or institution of higher education,
6. The CETA program issues each year a set of income eligibility standards varying by 
family size, by county, and by metropolitan or non-metropolitan area. See "Labor Depart 
ment Revises Income Levels Used for CETA Eligibility," News, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Washington, DC, June 2, 1980.
7. This compares with the 20 or 25 percent weekly minimum proposed earlier for the UI 
qualifying requirement.
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or in a technical or vocational training program, pro 
vided that the education or training was completed 
satisfactorily.
The first requirement, of course, admits UI exhaustees 
from any tier. The second admits claimants who fail to meet 
the more stringent UI requirements. It also qualifies workers 
whose employment is not now covered by UI, mainly 
workers with employment on small farms or in domestic 
household service.
The third requirement is an attempt to bring in claimants 
with even less prior employment than 14 weeks but with the 
work shortfall made up by ES registration. Other alter 
natives could be designed involving even fewer weeks of 
work or more weeks of registration. Some current state UI 
requirements, especially when based on flat annual earnings, 
do admit workers to UI with less than 14 weeks of work. 
Having UA available for at least some of these where low in 
come is a problem would ease the impact of stiffening the UI 
requirement.
The fourth requirement aims at new entrants and reen 
trants, particularly young people. Here, too, alternative 
designs could vary the number of weeks required or add a 
period of ES registration after school completion. The re 
quirement for satisfactory completion of school or training 
is intended to induce students and trainees to stay with their 
work and not drop out. Many youngsters do work on jobs 
while in school, either part time or during summer or holiday 
periods. They may be able to meet the second or third re 
quirements, or even qualify for UI, without completing 
school.
Persons who have not worked before, or have not worked 
for a year or more, and have not had schooling or training 
recently, would not be eligible for UA. This category may in 
clude some of the current adult recipients of AFDC. Many
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welfare mothers do have some employment, perhaps 
sporadic or unstable in nature, but sometimes enough to 
meet the second or third requirement. Lacking that, those 
who want employment or are required to be available for 
work in order to receive cash support should be steered into 
training or helped to obtain some kind of work to establish 
at least a foothold in the labor force.
Other requirements and disqualifications
UA recipients would have to be able to work, to be 
available for work, and to actively seek work. They would 
have to be available for full-time employment. Some recip 
ients may have problems regarding reliable child care; such 
problems would be good cause for temporary nonavailability 
and would not be reasons for suspending UA. Claimants 
would be excused from the availability and job search re 
quirements while in approved training.
Disqualifications for UA would be for the same reasons 
that apply for UI. UA payments would be suspended 13 
weeks for voluntary leaving of work or training without 
good cause and for misconduct discharges. Refusal of a 
suitable job or training opportunity also would result in a 
13-week suspension. As with UI, what constitutes "suitable" 
work or training would be determined on an individual basis, 
taking account of the claimant's prior work experience, 
training, education, and capabilities, as well as the duration 
of unemployment and current labor market conditions. In 
general, UA claimants could be required to reduce their job- 
level and wage expectations more and sooner than UI recip 
ients.
Benefit reviewers and job search counselors would meet 
periodically with UA claimants to encourage and guide their 
job search, to consider training possibilities or other types of 
vocational adjustments, and to assure that claimants are
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available and seeking work. If some nonwork-connected 
problem arises that interferes with the job search or training, 
the UA claimant would be referred to an appropriate service 
or agency for assistance. No UA benefit suspension would be 
imposed for interruption of availability, training, or job 
search under such circumstances if there is good cause for 
the interruption, if the claimant is taking reasonable steps to 
overcome the problem, and if the interruption does not last 
beyond a limited period of time, such as four weeks or less, 
depending on the nature of the problem. Temporary illness 
or disability would not cause UA suspension if not expected 
to last more than a few weeks; if longer, the claimant should 
file for Supplementary Security Income administered by the 
Social Security Administration for disabled needy persons.
UA claimants waiting to qualify through a combination of 
work and employment service registration must be available 
for work and seeking work during the registration period. 
They should be required to report at least once during this 
time to consult with a UA reviewer and a jobsearch 
counselor concerning their activity and status. Failure to 
report, without good cause, would result in the loss of credit 
for weeks registered up to that point.
Weekly Amount of UA
As with UI, the weekly UA amount payable would be 
related to the claimant's recent prior earnings, if such earn 
ings experience exists. This approach is another means of 
focusing on the recipient as a worker rather than as a welfare 
case. Although UA would be a federal program, the UA 
amounts payable would be set to reflect interstate variations 
in wages as well. The recommended approach is to have the 
weekly UA amounts relate to the UI WBAs.
For eligible claimants who have exhausted UI, the pro 
posal is to set the UA weekly amount equal to 90 percent of
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the UI benefit. For claimants who have not received UI but 
qualify for UA with at least 14 weeks of work, the weekly 
amount would equal 90 percent of what the UI WBA would 
have been if based on earnings in that employment. The UA 
amount is set 10 percent lower than the UI level to increase 
incentives to take lower paying jobs.
The main problem in assigning UA amounts would arise 
for claimants with very little or no recent employment. These 
include new entrants and reentrants to the labor market, and 
marginal or very irregular workers. Youngsters who have 
recently completed their schooling and AFDC mothers are 
prominent among them. Many of these individuals may have 
worked to some extent, part time or for brief periods, while 
in school or when child-care arrangements could be made. 
Those with at least 10 weeks of employment in the past year 
would qualify for UA after having registered at the ES for a 
required period. The UA amount could be based on average 
earnings during the weeks worked. It would be wise, 
however, to consider whether or not that average is a 
distorted representation of the claimant's normal earning 
capacity. Concentrated work in short periods involving 
much overtime can lead to an unrepresentative weekly 
average. The same is true where the employment consisted of 
very limited part-time work. One approach would be to 
calculate a weekly earning capacity based on the hourly rate 
earned, excluding overtime, multiplied by a specified 
number of hours per week.
For those with no recent employment, or less than 10 
weeks of work, but who qualify on the basis of completed 
education or training, the problem is more difficult. If it is 
clear that the training or education could qualify the in 
dividual for a particular type of job, then the locally prevail 
ing entry wage for that job could be used as the basis for the 
UA amount. If not, the federal or state statutory minimum
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hourly wage could be used to develop a weekly wage base for 
the UA amount.
The most difficult problem comes with the individual who 
currently receives AFDC. AFDC recipients who have had 
some employment during the past year would be able to 
qualify for UA, or might even qualify for UI. The weekly 
UA (or UI) amount payable, however, may be less than the 
cash support (prorated weekly) provided by AFDC. The 
AFDC amount is not related to wage experience but is, in 
stead, more closely related to a minimal living standard con 
cept, or some proportion of a minimal level, taking account 
of the number of dependent children, housing cir 
cumstances, etc. AFDC amounts provided by the states vary 
widely. In May 1980, for example, the average monthly 
AFDC payment per family ranged among the states from 
$87 to $384. The U.S. average payment was $271.8 The 
AFDC payment thus could and often would exceed the in 
come provided by UA or UI, especially for larger families. 
AFDC recipients who qualify for UI currently may choose 
whichever program they wish to use; they are not likely to 
choose the one yielding a lower level of support. Even when 
UI exceeds the AFDC cash support level, recipients may still 
prefer AFDC since it entitles them to Medicaid and housing 
supplements not available to UI claimants. If the UA 
amount is substantially less than AFDC, it would be hard to 
justify a policy that abruptly eliminates AFDC for persons 
who can work and could qualify for UA.
There appears to be no easy solution to this dilemma. One 
possibility is a gradual phaseout of AFDC for such persons. 
Over a period of time, the AFDC support they are paid could 
be reduced by small amounts until UA (or UI) becomes more 
attractive. Recent reform proposals did call for a lower cash
8. Public Assistance Payments, May 1980, U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser 
vices, Social Security Administration, December 1980, p. 10.
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support level for families containing adults required to be 
available for work. Another possibility is to add dependent 
children's allowances to the basic UA amount, but in states 
which do not add allowances to UI, the UA-UI relationship 
would become distorted. Another would be to allow families 
on AFDC to continue to receive the children's portion as a 
supplement to UA (or UI) to the extent needed to make up 
the difference. Eligibility for Medicaid and housing subsidies 
could also continue. Some transition approach can be devis 
ed with some protection against a sudden severe decline in 
the level of support in individual cases.
Although UA recipients must be available for full-time 
work, a partial UA amount would be provided when the 
claimant takes a part-time job as a temporary expedient and 
earns an amount per week equal to less than about 1.6 times 
the weekly UA amount. The full UA amount would be 
reduced by two-thirds of the amount earned, less a disregard 
of 15 percent of earnings.
UA Duration
As long as the UA recipient actively seeks work and meets 
all other requirements with respect to job search and 
counseling advice, UA would continue to be payable. No 
specific limit is set on its duration. Except for periods of 
severe and prolonged recession, it is difficult to conceive of a 
UA recipient being unable to obtain some kind of employ 
ment for at least 14 weeks in a year's time. Continued 
failure, however, to find employment or to benefit from 
training or some other remedial assistance would have to be 
construed as evidence that the recipient is not employable. 
After a year, unless some special circumstances justify con 
tinued UA in such cases, the recipient could be judged no 
longer eligible. Application for SSI as a disabled individual 
might be indicated.
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Administration of UA
Although UA is designed as a federal program financed by 
federal general revenues, the states would administer UA as 
part of the proposed Job Security System. Its close 
resemblance to UI and the important application of employ 
ment services and job search assistance make the state agen 
cy the logical selection for UA administration. A separate 
operation would defeat the objective of treating UA 
claimants primarily as jobseekers.
Some UI administrators may seriously object to state 
agency acceptance of responsibility for UA. They may feel it 
would weaken or dilute efforts to maintain a high-quality UI 
operation. Other special programs of cash support for 
unemployed workers have been assigned to them over the 
years, often with inadequate administrative resources. That 
is a legitimate cause for resistance to added responsibilities. 
Without sufficient and well-trained staff and satisfactory 
support in general, UA cannot expect to achieve its objec 
tives.
Another objection concerns the mix of the insurance and 
welfare concepts within the same overall administrative 
system. The application of an income test for UA carries the 
possible connotation of "inferior" status vis a vis UI. The 
fear is that the stigma may "rub off" on UI and that both 
administrative staff and the public may degrade their treat 
ment and view of UI claimants and weaken the social in 
surance traditions that have helped maintain the dignity of 
the UI program. This, too, is a legitimate concern. The 
response is that, compared with the existing welfare ap 
proach for employable persons, the proposed UA program 
goes far to escape welfare connotations. The income test is 
not poverty oriented, and there is no investigation of 
household assets. As it is with UI, the emphasis is on 
employment, not need. If handled properly, there need not
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be any loss of status or dignity by UI claimants, and UA reci 
pients can achieve a more favorable position than is the case 
when dependent on AFDC or general assistance. Much 
would depend on how aggressively and successfully the agen 
cy presses the objective of employment equally for both UI 
and UA.
Potential Cost and Impact of UA
No estimates for UA costs are available. Certainly, UA 
would add a new dimension and a new set of costs. To some 
extent, offsetting cost savings would be realized, as UA 
would replace other forms of support in many instances. The 
tendency to extend UI duration during recession through 
federal supplemental benefits has become well established. 
With UA, such extension may be less likely to occur. Because 
of the income test and lower weekly amount for UA, less 
would be paid out in UA to exhaustees than in supplemental 
UI benefits for the period FSB would be payable. A study of 
exhaustees of regular UI and EB who drew FSB in 1975-1977 
found that about 30 percent were from households with 
money income equal to at least twice the official poverty 
level; the household incomes of another 14 percent were be 
tween 1.5 and 2.0 times the poverty level. 9 Assuming applica 
tion of the proposed UA income test, this finding implies 
that almost 45 percent of all UI exhaustees under the three- 
tier program potentially eligible for FSB during recession 
periods would not qualify for UA. 10
Where AFDC and General Assistance recipients shift to 
UA, offsetting cost savings would occur. For the same in-
9. Walter Corson and Walter Nicholson, The Federal Supplemental Benefits Program—An 
Appraisal of Emergency Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Kalamazoo, MI: 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, forthcoming 1981).
10. Using 1979 figures cited earlier for four-person families, the lower level budget was 
about 1.7 times the poverty threshold.
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dividuals, however, it is difficult to tell if the net effect 
overall would be higher or lower costs.
UA would go to other workers who are not now supported 
by existing programs. Besides UI exhaustees who meet the 
income test, unemployed workers unable to qualify for UI 
because of limited employment might be able to qualify for 
UA. To the extent that states raise their UI qualifying re 
quirements because of UA, there would be offsetting cost 
savings in UI. Jobseekers, especially youths, who qualify for 
UA on the basis of completed education or training would 
add a new element of cost.
Because UA is not strictly limited in duration, there may 
be concern about the potential costliness of such a more or 
less open-ended program. Moreover, the indefinite 
availability of UA may lower incentives to seek and take 
jobs. There is, of course, no duration limit on the current 
AFDC programs either. With an aggressive pursuit of job 
search and vocational adjustment, pressed by JSS staff, the 
expectation is that continued dependence on UA would not 
be indefinite. Those efforts would also help offset disincen 
tive effects of UA, as would the lower rate of wage-loss com 
pensation as compared with UI rates. In some cases, UA 
recipients who fail to find employment may be judged 
unemployable and removed from the UA program. They 
may qualify for cash support under the Supplemental Securi 
ty Income program for aged and disabled persons who are 
unable to work.
Estimates of UA costs require data describing potential 
recipients by household size and income, work and earnings 
experience, and education or training experience. For some 
groups, part but not all of the information may be available 
by which to estimate who could qualify for UA. Eligibility of 
UI exhaustees and current AFDC recipients may be easiest to 
estimate, although the principal difficulty would be lack of
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household income information for UI exhaustees and work 
experience information for AFDC recipients. For other 
potential clients, the data available is even less solid. Apart 
from eligibility, estimates of claimant duration of UA are 
also quite problematical because of the lack of information 
about very long term unemployment experienced by low- 
income households as well as the potential effects of ag 
gressive, assisted job search efforts. Some claimants, no 
doubt, would move in and out of employment and float be 
tween UA and UI, a difficult pattern to estimate.
While some estimates of UA costs can be made and should 
be pursued, their reliability may be limited or uncertain. One 
way to overcome the problem is to establish UA on an ex 
perimental basis in a state or two, or in a few areas, and gain 
some experience. Another is to begin UA slowly by making it 
available to one or two categories of potential recipients at 
first and expanding its coverage gradually. UI exhaustees, 
for example, may be the first candidates for UA, followed by 
workers not covered by AFDC, and then AFDC recipients. 
This order would place first emphasis on unemployed 
workers who have no other source of cash support.
VII. SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Reemployment is the primary objective of the proposed 
Job Security System. Its various programs are all designed to 
support that goal. Workers who lose their jobs or experience 
temporary layoff could turn to the JSS for job search 
assistance, other reemployment services, and partial wage- 
loss replacement through unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance. Under normal labor market con 
ditions, most of the unemployed would return to work in a 
relatively short period, usually within two or three months.
When jobless workers initially file for benefits or apply for 
employment services, the system's first procedure would be 
to identify those who may face difficulty in regaining 
employment. The system would continue to work with 
claimants or applicants so identified through diagnosis of 
their problems, through periodic counseling to guide their 
job search, and by arranging for retraining or other kinds of 
adjustments that may enhance their employability. The 
Employment Service component of the JSS would have the 
principal responsibility for these functions but would work 
closely with UI and UA staff in servicing individual workers 
drawing income support. Matching jobseekers and job open 
ings in good volume and across a broad range of occupations 
would strengthen the labor exchange function of the ES and
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the assistance it can provide to the unemployed and to 
employers in local labor markets. The ES would also be the 
center for labor market information. The better its detailed 
knowledge of current local employment conditions and the 
better its methods to make that knowledge directly useful to 
jobseekers and employers, the better its contribution to 
reduced unemployment and the effective use of labor 
resources.
Although existing state Employment Services (or Job Ser 
vices) perform all of these functions to one degree or 
another, most are not doing so comprehensively or 
systematically, particularly with regard to workers with 
established labor force attachment the experienced 
unemployed. Restriction of administrative resources over the 
last 15 years has limited ES capacity to serve adequately a 
greatly expanded labor force. ES activities have been increas 
ingly diverted from mainstream goals to service special pro 
grams, such as registering welfare and food stamp recipients 
for work test purposes but with little or no genuine follow 
through, operating the employment and training aspects of 
the WIN program for adult AFDC recipients, and dealing 
with a variety of needs of the GET A programs. Funds 
allocated to cover the added costs of these activities have not 
been adequate. As a result, the ES has played a diminishing 
role in helping experienced unemployed workers regain 
employment. Past efforts to disassociate the ES from the UI 
program to improve the former's image and stature as a 
manpower agency only added further to that result. The pro 
posed JSS calls for a reorientation of the ES to reemphasize 
the job search needs of experienced workers and a 
strengthening of its capacity to serve those needs.
Under the proposed system, the UI program would be 
restructured to support more strongly the reemployment 
goal. States would still specify the statutory details of UI and
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continue to administer the program. The federal role, 
however, would be expanded through the application of ad 
ditional minimum standards or requirements and through in 
creased federal financing of benefits. The new program's 
scope of protection would not extend beyond 39 weeks of 
benefits in a single year. UI would be organized into 3 suc 
cessive tiers, each providing 13 weeks of benefits. In succes 
sion, the three tiers would provide compensation for short, 
medium, and long term unemployment. Including the long 
term tier, all tiers would be available at all times, without 
regard to variations in the level of unemployment. Claimants 
would have to meet increasingly stiff tests of past work at 
tachment as they move from one tier to the next. The tests 
would require at least 14 to 20 weeks of work in the past year 
to qualify for tier 1 benefits, 26 weeks of work for tier 2, and 
39 weeks of work (or 52 weeks during the last 2 years) to 
qualify for tier 3. The requirements governing the claimant's 
current availability for work and job search would also grow 
stricter as unemployment lengthens. UI claimants would be 
pressed to consider a broader range of job alternatives and 
lower wage levels as they move from tier to tier. Local labor 
market conditions would affect the intensity of the job 
search efforts expected of claimants. The distinct and formal 
procedure of moving from one tier to the next would not on 
ly emphasize the stiffer requirements, it would also require a 
reassessment of reemployment prospects and job search 
strategy. The process is meant to impress upon the claimant 
and staff the need for a more urgent attitude about the prob 
lem and for a willingness to consider other, perhaps less at 
tractive, steps to regain employment. Failure by the claimant 
to respond reasonably to advice offered could lead to benefit 
suspension.
States would finance all benefit costs of tier 1 through 
their own experience-rated UI taxes. State and federal UI tax 
revenues would finance equally the benefit costs of tier 2,
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while tier 3 costs would be covered entirely by federal UI 
taxes. This arrangement views the UI costs of short term 
unemployment as the responsibility of individual employers 
and appropriately allocates costs to them through 
experience-rated taxes. Individual employer responsibility 
for UI costs becomes less supportable as unemployment 
lengthens. The general condition of the labor market, 
changes in national and international consumer markets, 
foreign competition, federal policies, and other factors that 
exert their influence without regard to state lines are deemed 
more likely to account for longer term unemployment than 
factors that operate within states or that individual 
employers can control. More pooling, among employers and 
on a national basis, of the UI costs of longer term unemploy 
ment is therefore considered justifiable and a reasonable ra 
tionale for the new financing arrangements. These ar 
rangements would also ease the solvency problems of state 
UI funds. Federal financing of longer term benefit costs, in 
effect, reinsures the state funds against very high and un 
predictable recession costs without establishing a special 
reinsurance scheme for the purpose.
Under the proposed program, federal minimum standards 
would apply to state weekly benefit amount provisions to 
reduce the present uneven treatment around the country of 
UI claimants with the same wage experience. The standards 
would require compensation of at least half the claimant's 
weekly wage loss up to a maximum amount that is not less 
than two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage in 
covered employment. Revised partial benefit provisions 
would offer more incentives than do present provisions for 
claimants to take temporary part-time work. They would en 
courage and accommodate work sharing as an alternative to 
full layoffs.
Estimates indicate that the total benefit costs of the three- 
tier UI program would exceed the costs of the current pro-
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gram of regular and extended benefits, especially when 
unemployment rates are low. The difference would diminish 
as these rates increase and disappear at high rates of 
unemployment. Estimates also show that tier 1 costs would 
account for about 60 percent of all benefits under the three 
tiers.
With a 39-week limit, the UI program's integrity as a 
social insurance program would be better preserved than has 
been the case during the recessions of the 1970s when sup 
plemental benefits extended the length of UI protection 
beyond that limit. To meet the needs of UI exhaustees and of 
other unemployed workers not eligible for UI, the JSS would 
provide a new program of Unemployment Assistance. UA 
would be payable to unemployed workers who meet both a 
past employment test and a household income test. The 
former test would be less stringent than that for UI eligibility 
and allow for some substitution of registered job search time 
or time spent in training for weeks of employment. The sug 
gested income test would apply an eligibility threshold 
equivalent to the lower level living standard budget estimated 
annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This level is well 
above the official poverty line but still likely to exclude about 
45 percent of UI exhaustees from UA eligibility. UA weekly 
cash benefits would be wage-related, but lower than UI 
benefits.
UA recipients would be subject to the same job search and 
counseling review procedures as UI claimants. They would, 
however, be confronted with greater pressure to consider or 
accept a broader range of employment than that reflective of 
prior experience and wage levels. Current recipients of 
AFDC, food stamps, and general assistance who are re 
quired to be available for work would apply for UA instead. 
The remaining welfare programs would then be confined to 
nonparticipants in the labor force. With the new program, 
employable individuals now on welfare would be treated
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essentially as jobseekers and not as welfare cases. The em 
phasis would be on job search, week by week, rather than on 
the monthly or semi-monthly welfare check which is needs- 
related, not wage-related. Low-income unemployed workers 
not now eligible for UI or welfare could also apply for UA. 
The new program would be administered for the federal 
government by state JSS agencies, with all costs financed by 
federal general revenues.
Concluding Observations
The proposed Job Security System represents a substantial 
departure from existing arrangements, but it also represents 
a return to some of the earlier thinking about how to deal 
with the unemployment of workers. A major concern about 
unemployment insurance at the outset was with the "moral 
hazard'' involved the fear that UI recipients would tend to 
malinger, to delay returning to work. One important 
safeguard against this risk was a public employment service 
with a good labor exchange operation. Indeed, a public ES 
was generally regarded as a prerequisite to the establishment 
of UI. It was natural that UI and ES were closely linked at 
the beginning. The more recent weakened connection be 
tween the two may be partly responsible for the revived 
public concern about the disincentive effects of UI. 1 The JSS 
would restore the strong link. Besides applying the work test, 
the ES would be called upon to expand and intensify positive 
approaches to assist the job search of the insured 
unemployed. All components of the JSS are designed with 
the central focus on reemployment in mind. At the same 
time, the restructuring of UI for this purpose also aims at 
resolving or easing some of the problems that currently face 
the program. Similarly, the proposed new UA program, in
1. Recent studies of disincentive effects ignore or discount any offsetting effects of ES ap 
plications of the work test to claimants.
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its orientation to labor force participation, seeks to solve 
some of the dilemmas encountered by welfare reform ef 
forts. If it is agreed that reemployment is the appropriate 
central objective of public programs for the unemployed and 
that some of the difficulties of these programs can be 
diminished in the process of reorganizing them around that 
objective, then the JSS approach has much to recommend it.
A major question, however, is whether a strengthened and 
revitalized Employment Service with expanded job search 
assistance efforts for experienced unemployed workers can 
produce significant reemployment results and be cost effec 
tive. The added administrative costs will be substantial. Staff 
required to apply the more intensive and individualized 
treatments will have to be larger and more highly trained. 
The direct payoff is in shorter unemployment and reduced 
outlays for income support. Indirect benefits include more 
productive use of labor resources, increased wage earnings 
with multiplier effects on demand, greater tax revenues, 
more economic activity in general, and various social gains 
from less unemployment. Several limited experiments with 
more concentrated services to UI claimants, made about 10 
or more years ago, offered some promise that favorable 
results can be achieved if such efforts are not inhibited by 
very poor labor market conditions. 2
This monograph has presented the JSS proposal with a 
considerable amount of specific detail. The purpose is to 
make more tangible the ideas underlying the system and the 
means for their implementation. Details, of course, can 
vary; those suggested do not in themselves constitute a rigid 
set of specifications. The broader design features are more 
important to the system as a whole. For example, a 
strengthened ES refocused to promote the job search and 
reemployment of the experienced unemployed is crucial to
2. See footnote 5, ch. IV.
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the scheme. Exactly how the services are organized and staff 
ed can involve a range of alternatives. The three-tier design 
for the UI program is important to its support of the 
reemployment objective and to its phased cooperative effort 
with the ES as the unemployment of claimants lengthens. 
The details of federal rquirements and of financing patterns 
need not be identical to those described here, but something 
along the lines indicated would help ease the current issues 
concerning UI duration limits, benefit inequities and inade 
quacies among state provisions, and state UI fund insolven 
cy. A new UA program is important to preserve the social in 
surance integrity of UI and at the same time meet the needs 
of long term unemployed workers from low-income 
households who are beyond the duration limits of UI protec 
tion. The extent to which UA should be available to other 
jobseekers, including those now receiving welfare, is a less 
vital question to the total JSS scheme. A broader scope for 
UA, however, offers a means of rationalizing the treatment 
of work-oriented welfare recipients and other low-income 
unemployed. The specific UA eligibility tests and weekly 
benefit levels described here are mainly illustrative.
The JSS proposal need not and probably should not be im 
plemented all at once. It can serve as a broad plan to be 
achieved through a series of steps following a sequence 
leading eventually to the total system. A good place to start 
is with the employment services. Their strengthening and 
systematic application to UI claimants at appropriate stages 
of unemployment is the most important aspect of the new 
system to develop quickly. It will take time to perfect the 
approaches that work best and to shape a staff that can 
employ them well. Building on the U.S. Department of 
Labor's current Eligibility Review Program may be the way 
to proceed, concentrating first in a few states and then ex 
panding to others after refinements are made. An ex 
perimental UA program could come next, perhaps confined
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at first to UI exhaustees, then including low-income 
unemployed not now eligible for welfare, and finally adding 
current welfare recipients who are employable. Redesign of 
UI may be the most difficult step to take because it involves 
considerable reform of existing state programs, and requires 
state as well as federal legislation. Federal provision of long 
term (tier 3) benefits at all times, applying the additional re 
quirements and full federal financing, could be offered first 
as a replacement for the existing triggered EB program. 
Reassessment of the prospects and job search needs of 
claimants before they draw more than 13 weeks of benefits 
could also be emphasized, along with increased intensity of 
counseling and review services. The most significant results 
of the step-by-step process may be the improvements gained 
in diagnosing reemployment problems and in learning how 
best to tailor services to individual needs. Patterns that 
emerge in dealing with the unemployed with respect to the 
stages and duration of their unemployment are likely to sug 
gest the value and best design for a tiered UI program.
The proposed system provides some new ways to think 
about dealing with the problems of unemployment and 
welfare. As existing programs age and grow subject to 
various degrees of rigidity, the need for fresh viewpoints in 
creases. This monograph will serve an important purpose if 
it stimulates thinking and debate about these problems along 
new lines.







